> That's really not a fair summary of the situation. Apple took a stand, rightly in my view, to dig their heels in under the request to make a permanent back door for FBI (and likely other groups) usage. There is a massive difference

This is history rewriting, the request, in his least dangerous form, was to unlock a single phone from inside Apple labs by Apple people

Incorrect -- they requested an "instrument", which carries with it all sorts of legal requirements beyond creating an in-house tool.

Source: http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/?p=5645

They made both requests. Apple refused both requests.

I respect that view. Here's where I disagree: I think Apple taking a similar stand for the illegal wiretapping makes sense (giant open door, no court oversight), but not for this case (could be clean roomed, court oversight)

Is a company that makes safes legally required to have a master key or to create a master key even when they don't want to? The question is whether or not a 3rd party can be compelled to create something which does not exist in order to aid in the execution of a search warrant. I think it's pretty clear based on prior All Writs Act precedent[1] that Apple should not be required to produce new software code for cases like this.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._New_York_Tele...

I think there's a strong case for first-amendment rights in code signing even in the case of a non-ephemeral signing key. In any case, look at the use of a search warrant with Lavabit—is it clear that the All Writs act was even their strongest legal suit?