> I do not believe governments (especially ones engaged in clandestine surveillance operations) have an obligation to share security vulnerabilities with companies.

So I take it then you don't believe in a government "for the people"? Like it or not, Apple is legally a person, and even tossing that aside, we know that many of Apple's customers are American citizens, and this whole idea of "keeping knowledge from you for your own good" just reeks of the patronizing oligarchy that the US government has become known for.

Lest you jump to the argument that this would endanger operations, I would still point out two very salient facts: this information is not intelligence data, and as Schneier pointed out, this attack can be used against many in the US government, including FBI agents in the field. Getting it fixed is the right thing to do.

Agents who handle secret or otherwise restricted data should not be handling it on a mobile device. Those devices should be sanitized.

Presuming security is what gets people compromised (and in some cases in political trouble as one US presidential candidate is coming to realize).

Presuming security is when someone says "restricted data should not be [handled] on a mobile device". Spills happen, intentionally or otherwise. This security hole should be fixed before a field agent gets his iPhone hacked by the Chinese.

> Lest you jump to the argument that this would endanger operations, I would still point out two very salient facts: this information is not intelligence data, and as Schneier pointed out, this attack can be used against many in the US government, including FBI agents in the field. Getting it fixed is the right thing to do.

I agree with you that given the facts we know today, notifying Apple is the right thing to do. But I also think the FBI should have some latitude in deciding what is in its best interest; and if they're making their own agents vulnerable to an exploit they know exists -- well, that's dumb and I hope it bites them in the ass.

We do not even know if the FBI knows the vulnerability. The phone could have been attacked by a contractor working for the FBI without the contractor sharing the tools.

This is a great point. Cellebrite's known for their black box approach. Law enforcements and Courts can send their locked iPhone and get it back unlocked. They'll just get the job done without knowing what was actually performed on the phone. This might as well be the case here.

Doesn't this approach cast doubt on the legitimacy of any evidence obtained from the device?

Don't think so, it's basically like lock picking a suspect's apartment with a warrant. What is found should be valid evidence, no? Law enforcement can break the door or call a locksmith and pay him for his service. In this case Cellebrite's the locksmith.

That seems reasonable, but usually investigators would be on the scene while the locksmith works. If the process is a black box that happens while the device is in Cellebrite's possession isn't it more like calling up the locksmith from the precinct and saying "hey, could you open up the apartment at this address and call us when you're done? Don't go inside or touch anything though, thanks!" What prevents Cellebrite employees from planting or deleting evidence after the device is unlocked and before returning it? What guarantees are there that Cellebrite's unlocking process doesn't intentionally or unintentionally modify some other aspect of the device? Scouts honor? What if their process is to just flash a new rom filled with child porn and no passcode then skip merrily to the bank to cash their checks?

Yep, I understand that. I don't think that was posed as a problem in the Italian case I know of, although I think that in the U.S. rules on the chain of custody are stricter, indeed. That's a good point.

> Apple is legally a person

it's not government "for the persons"

> I respect Bruce and he's done a ton of great work, but I obviously disagree with him on this point. I do not believe governments (especially ones engaged in clandestine surveillance operations) have an obligation to share security vulnerabilities with companies.

Interesting. What obligations do governments have? On the one hand we have government agencies (the CPA, e.g.) whose entire function is to protect consumers from bad products and marketing. On the other hand there's the many regulatory and standards bodies, which are to ensure orderly marketplaces and discourage anti-competition. Then there's an agency that protects the environment, one that administers health, education....yet there's no obligation to disclose security vulnerabilities? Hmmppf. I'm stumped.

Here's the oath stated by FBI agents when they join [1],

> I [name] do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.

[1] https://www2.fbi.gov/publications/leb/2009/september2009/oat...

That oath is worth nothing given the Greatest threat to the Constitution is the FBI, NSA and other parts of the Federal Government

They may swear a oath to the constitution, but they are actually Loyal to the Federal Government, not the Constitution.

Your comment is snarky but on the money. I have a very, very bad feeling we're losing our Republic to the State and its various apparatuses.

And here's what their "about" page says:

"Our mission is to help protect you, your children, your communities, and your businesses from the most dangerous threats facing our nation—from international and domestic terrorists to spies on U.S. soil…from cyber villains to corrupt government officials…from mobsters to violent street gangs…from child predators to serial killers."

Our mission is to help protect ... your businesses ... from cyber villains. The FBI acknowledges right on their home page that they have an obligation to share security vulnerabilities with companies.

https://www.fbi.gov/about-us

> I do not believe governments (especially ones engaged in clandestine surveillance operations) have an obligation to share security vulnerabilities with companies.

Is this view particular to software defects? For example, do government inspectors have an obligation to report food safety violations that they've discovered? In either case, the problem puts the public at risk.

> I respect Bruce and he's done a ton of great work, but I obviously disagree with him on this point. I do not believe governments (especially ones engaged in clandestine surveillance operations) have an obligation to share security vulnerabilities with companies. But neither do those companies have an obligation to create vulnerabilities for the governments to exploit (on the contrary; the companies have an obligation to find and fix the holes in their products).

How do you determine if a vulnerability was there because it was overlooked in development, or if it was there because the government demanded it from the company but used the law to impose a gag order on the company preventing the public from finding out about it?

> How do you determine if a vulnerability was there because it was overlooked in development, or if it was there because the government demanded it from the company but used the law to impose a gag order on the company preventing the public from finding out about it?

You don't; but that's possible today with the way the gag orders and FISA courts work. That's a real problem around transparency in our legal system; which IMO is a different issue from transparency around security issues relating to privately-developed products.

That's a really interesting viewpoint. Thanks for sharing it.

In my opinion the government should be obliged to share the vulnerability for the purposes of the keeping the rest of the users safe from the same exploit, whether executed by the government or executed by somebody else.

In summary, I disagree with you but I'm glad I took the time to ask you about your view since I learned something new.