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Re:Water treatment plant hacked, chemical mix changed for ta... by matt_wulfeck on Friday March 25, 2016 @06:26PM (#11363181)
It really boggles my mind that we don't air-gap every single one of these types of critical systems.

Can someone help me understand why this isn't more popular? Is it because they requirement controls from outside resources? Or maybe there's central places that rely on telemetry?

Another option: outgoing UDP packets only. Outgoing telemetry but nothing comes back in.

Re:Water treatment plant hacked, chemical mix changed for ta... by nickpsecurity on Friday March 25, 2016 @06:35PM (#11363225)
Management wants it done, done cheaply, with cheap support, and sometimes plugging into their dashboards. Clive Robinson, who did SCADA, said those things combine to make security nonexistent to afterthought in most installations.

I'll add a lesson from software world that it also pays to contract steady fixes over time instead of near-perfect the first time. That might partly be because people in such industries only make sacrifices after shit hits the fan publicly. See Target for example. ;)

Re:Water treatment plant hacked, chemical mix changed for ta... by akira2501 on Friday March 25, 2016 @09:49PM (#11364070)
Of course.. you /expect/ that to happen, which is why you establish an internal auditing process.
Re:Water treatment plant hacked, chemical mix changed for ta... by cpeterso on Friday March 25, 2016 @06:39PM (#11363258)
In related news this week: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/26/nyregion/rye-brook-dam-cau...

"The Bowman Avenue Dam in this low-key suburban village in Westchester County is … about the width of a modest living room, and the 20-foot-tall dam itself essentially keeps a babbling creek, the Blind Brook, from flooding basements and ground floors in houses downstream.

Yet, according to the authorities, it was the computer-guided controls of this dam that seven Iranian computer hackers chose to penetrate on behalf of that country’s Revolutionary Guards Corps, as part of a plot that also breached or paralyzed 46 of the nation’s largest financial institutions and blocked hundreds of thousands of customers from accessing their bank accounts online.

Re:Water treatment plant hacked, chemical mix changed for ta... by 13thLetter on Friday March 25, 2016 @07:36PM (#11363558)
It's weird how the news that agents of a foreign government were attempting to sabotage American infrastructure, which is -- I realize this is an antiquated notion nowadays -- an act of war, is received with shrugs and yawns and no real action. Imagine the screaming worldwide if hackers working for the CIA were breaking into Iranian dams and financial institutions.
Re:Water treatment plant hacked, chemical mix changed for ta... by cperciva on Friday March 25, 2016 @08:02PM (#11363689)
Imagine the screaming worldwide if hackers working for the CIA were breaking into Iranian dams and financial institutions.

They broke into the Iranian nuclear program without much condemnation, so...

Re:Water treatment plant hacked, chemical mix changed for ta... by 13thLetter on Friday March 25, 2016 @09:06PM (#11363888)
I recall a lot of wailing about how irresponsible they were deploying their sinister infrastructure-damaging war viruses, and such. But thinking about it more, I'll grant it depends on your perspective of the whole issue, so my point doesn't really stand.

I still find it dismaying that we so casually accept this state of affairs. There is no meaningful difference between attacks like this and a foreign agent setting fire to the bank building or physically sabotaging the dam.

Re:Water treatment plant hacked, chemical mix changed for ta... by cperciva on Friday March 25, 2016 @09:43PM (#11364039)
There was some wailing from the computer security community, but nothing in the world of international diplomacy. And I'm sure that's why the USA isn't kicking up a fuss over this latest incident -- they want to avoid setting a precedent which would come back to haunt them the next time they're caught doing the same thing.
Re:Water treatment plant hacked, chemical mix changed for ta... by lordchair on Friday March 25, 2016 @09:08PM (#11363897)
The US's cyber attacks on foreign countries are certainly the most funded and advanced campaigns of their kind. For reference here are the wikipedia pages of two of the most public pieces of malware your tax dollars have produced:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stuxnet https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flame_(malware)

Both of these were directed primarily at Iran. And that second one, flame, has been described as "the most complex malware ever found."

Re:Water treatment plant hacked, chemical mix changed for ta... by thaumasiotes on Saturday March 26, 2016 @01:49AM (#11364624)
> the news that agents of a foreign government were attempting to sabotage American infrastructure, which is -- I realize this is an antiquated notion nowadays -- an act of war, is received with shrugs and yawns

War is a big deal. You can't just rely on something meeting an old formal definition of "act of war"; to cause a war, there's got to be a risk of more damage (by some accounting) than we would do to ourselves by going to war.

Re:Water treatment plant hacked, chemical mix changed for ta... by ljf on Saturday March 26, 2016 @04:21AM (#11364883)
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stuxnet

Don't you remember Stuxnet? That is exactly what the us was doing! Surely it's been deniable, but who do you think did it?

Re:Water treatment plant hacked, chemical mix changed for ta... by achillean on Friday March 25, 2016 @09:57PM (#11364098)
This is a long-standing issue that a lot of people are aware of but fixing it is difficult. I've written and presented on the topic a few times, see: https://blog.shodan.io/state-of-control-systems-in-the-usa-2...
Re:Water treatment plant hacked, chemical mix changed for ta... by WaylonKenning on Saturday March 26, 2016 @04:38AM (#11364908)
I've worked in utilities before, and sometimes it's not possible to airgap those systems. After all, someone needs to login and update and performance maintenance on those SCADA systems. And it's pretty expensive to fly those people in, and sometimes not possible.

But there are optical routers that guarantee one way only access to networks. My favorite method is a switch, with the power supply connected to a physical timer. Once the time's up, the power supply is cut, and that device no longer is accessible. Quite ingenious really.

Re:Water treatment plant hacked, chemical mix changed for ta... by LoSboccacc on Saturday March 26, 2016 @05:12AM (#11364991)
Wouldn't a signed update disk be cheaper to fly?
Re:Water treatment plant hacked, chemical mix changed for ta... by rsync on Saturday March 26, 2016 @01:24AM (#11364558)
"It really boggles my mind that we don't air-gap every single one of these types of critical systems."

I would go even further.

To air-gap something implies that you are breaking the physical link that it could interact on the network with.

I would suggest that these systems should not have networking capabilities at all. The controllers for a dam, or power plant, or (insert critical infrastructure here) should not have networking hardware or even a networking stack.

Re:Water treatment plant hacked, chemical mix changed for ta... by thaumasiotes on Saturday March 26, 2016 @01:46AM (#11364618)
This implies that if you want to open or shut part of your dam, some guy with muscles has to go out and physically move the relevant parts. It won't work at all for heavy things, or things in inaccessible locations (dams are both of these, actually).

If you want someone to be able to adjust the dam, without putting out the physical effort required to make the adjustment, you need to network the dam. That way, the person can send a signal (easy) and a machine that's able to do the work can receive the signal and do the work (hard).

The most you can do is ensure that signals from the internet (or anywhere offsite) can't reach the dam. You need onsite signals.

Re:Water treatment plant hacked, chemical mix changed for ta... by rsync on Saturday March 26, 2016 @10:51AM (#11365811)
"This implies that if you want to open or shut part of your dam, some guy with muscles has to go out and physically move the relevant parts. It won't work at all for heavy things, or things in inaccessible locations (dams are both of these, actually)."

Yes, that is exactly what it implies.

This brings with it two very important and extremely valuable effects:

First, it means there is a human observing, on a regular basis, the behavior of the system - someone "has a feel" for how things work and can (with the intellect and perception of a human brain) "sense" when something is not right.

Second, it means, in the Taleb sense, that someone has "skin in the game". In the same way that I would be very disturbed if a commercial airliner had remote pilots, I would be similarly disturbed if a dam or a power plant had remote operators.

Finally, this human, locally present operator or operators probably shouldn't have Internet access - even on personal devices. There's no reason for it and it only adds risk and attack vectors. If you run the nuclear plant you can check twitter when you get home.

Re:Water treatment plant hacked, chemical mix changed for ta... by thaumasiotes on Sunday March 27, 2016 @02:11AM (#11369103)
I think you missed the part of my point where this can't be done. You can't hire someone to go open the dam himself and be crushed by the water that comes out. Nor can you hire people to move things that are too heavy for a person, or 100 people, to move.
Re:Water treatment plant hacked, chemical mix changed for ta... by rsync on Sunday March 27, 2016 @01:11PM (#11370625)
Yes, certainly I am not suggesting that we sacrifice humans to go open the sluice gates manually.

I am talking about doing it without computers. These things were done prior to computers with relays and switches and even status lights and a monitoring board, etc.

I'm advocating that we take out all of the general purpose capabilities as well as the ability to interoperate. A human being flicks a switch.

Re:Water treatment plant hacked, chemical mix changed for ta... by bifrost on Monday March 28, 2016 @03:00PM (#11376473)
We'd have to add a secondary remote interlock capability to prevent an out of control operator from doing something aberrant. Infrastructure without automation is hopefully dead, we just need to be smarter about how we accomplish it.
Re:Water treatment plant hacked, chemical mix changed for ta... by rsync on Monday March 28, 2016 @08:52PM (#11378763)
"Infrastructure without automation is hopefully dead"

No, no ... the "without automation" part is the entire point.

If a system is automated, then nobody has skin in the game - the way the pilot and copilot of your airplane do. The outcomes we want are the outcomes we get when the operator is the first one to go if something goes wrong.

It is in that interaction that we can rely on the (amazing, irreproducible, beautiful) ability of the human brain to recognize patterns and make brilliant deductive leaps.

That's just the very thing we want.

Re:Water treatment plant hacked, chemical mix changed for ta... by gizmo686 on Saturday March 26, 2016 @02:15AM (#11364677)
There is still a question of how complex the network is. One could argue that an IP based network stack is unnecessarily complex, and we should use a simpler system to improve reliability and security. In concept, the "network" could be nothing more than dumb wires connected to DIO and PWM ports.
Re:Water treatment plant hacked, chemical mix changed for ta... by thaumasiotes on Saturday March 26, 2016 @12:17PM (#11366181)
Oh, agreed.