I don't know that it's typical for research like this to comprehensively evaluate targets that aren't relevant to the research. Regardless, here we have an attack on the ECDSA k-nonce. People who use Curve25519 don't even use ECDSA; they use Ed25519's deterministic Schnorr-style signatures. It's not even the same signature construction.
So what you're asking of the authors seems a bit like the authors of the DROWN paper explaining that their RSA padding oracle attack doesn't work if you instead use DH key agreement.
One way or the other, this is really impressive work and it shows yet another reason to avoid ECDSA, unless you are a crypto rocket surgeon.
Also, Curve25519 is only side-channel resistant to timing side-channels, this does NOT protect it in any way against the EM side-channels exploited in this paper.
This only reinforces the point that performing an EM side-channel attack on Curve25519/NaCl/Sodium would have been a good contribution to the state of the art, with mentioning Curve25519 in the "Future work" section a viable second.
The implementations of ed25519 that you can find, including the ones worked on by DJB, are not "constant time everything"-- they're constant time for secret key operations. Other operations, like signature verification, are variable time... because that is usually fine and important for performance. It isn't always fine, however, -- you don't want an voting system anonymizer leaking information about which order it is validating which ballots, for example.
Of course, 25519 implementations are by far not the only cryptographic code which achieves basic side-channel resistance-- and there are other things which go further and try to achieve stronger resistance to other kinds of sidechannels by also implementing blinding...
If people go around incorrectly thinking these implementations are "constant time everything", eventually someone will get burned -- because the real culprit isn't constant time or not, it's the mismatch between requirements and provided properties. Since speed is also a frequently required (security!) property there is no such thing as a strictly more conservative choice, and no replacement for understanding and imagination.
There are a number of works that perform 'differential power analysis' (DPA) attacks on mobile devices that target symmetric crypto. These are generally both constant time and constant execution path. In this instance, attackers can attack the data dependancy in the EM emanations.
Simple example! a program that XORs two registers:
r1 = r1 XOR r2
If r2 has all the bits set to 1, then this will completely invert the contents of r1. This in turn consumes more energy (and hence emit more EM) in comparison to if r2 was all 0's. Hope that clarifies.
The best way to achieve constant time is making your code paths data independent, that is, it always execute the same instructions, whatever the data. This code will also use constant power and have constant EM emission. (Except for low level optimizations in hardware, that may break any of those characteristics.)
[0]: https://www.cis.upenn.edu/~nadiah/courses/cis800-02-f13/read...
Constant power and EM depend on some extra factors, but when there is variance, it is normally very small (a transistor or two not switching for each bit of difference).