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powerbutton65

Like it or not they are technically correct. SHA-256 is a one way compression and furthermore the PoW for bitcoin doesn't require a match for the entire hash.

There's loads of examples of this in the bitcoin network whenever there's been a fork and eventually orphaned blocks.

No worries :)

I've moved to silicon design and verification so quite a stretch from my previous work!

Unfortunately that is the one thing I can't really answer! I moved out of this space shortly after we published this work so I'm not currently up to date with the research in the area.

That said if you like this sort of work, you should keep an eye out for papers coming out from Tromer/Genkin et. al., they often present impressive results:

https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/230

https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/806

https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/119

and stuff from the guys at NewAE is usually well written and worth the read (although they are a startup and probably less focused on papers these days):

https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1047

https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/810

Other than that I'd suggest checking out what's published to CHES/Asiacrypt/CARDIS/COSADE.

Never thought I'd end up on here!

I'm one of the authors on the paper, it's few years old now but I'm happy to try answer any questions related to the work.

Yes, this exactly the basis of differential power analysis. This was first demonstrated back in 1999 by Kocher et al [0]

[0]: https://www.cis.upenn.edu/~nadiah/courses/cis800-02-f13/read...

The authors cite some EM side-channel attacks in the paper (eg [0,1])

[0]: https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/561.pdf [1]: https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/727.pdf

Constant time only reduces the chance of 'simple power analysis' (SPA) which is predominantly what the authors perform ('simple' is misleading but it's just the name for it).

There are a number of works that perform 'differential power analysis' (DPA) attacks on mobile devices that target symmetric crypto. These are generally both constant time and constant execution path. In this instance, attackers can attack the data dependancy in the EM emanations.

Simple example! a program that XORs two registers:

r1 = r1 XOR r2

If r2 has all the bits set to 1, then this will completely invert the contents of r1. This in turn consumes more energy (and hence emit more EM) in comparison to if r2 was all 0's. Hope that clarifies.

Valid question. You shift the burden from being a cryptography related problem to signal processing related problem.
The Apple hardware perspective is mostly just a gimmick. The side-channel leaks are a direct result of the ARM IP core (also not Apple proprietary). This is arguably old news, people have been attacking ARM based mobile devices for years now.

It would be far more interesting to see if they could attack the Apple crypto hardware accelerators which AFAIK are hardened against these types of attack (as is the Apple CommonCrypto framework as of IOS 9). Apple seems to have ramped up their side-channel game in recent years.

The paper serves to demonstrate that electromagnetic side-channel attacks on mobile devices (even almighty Apple stuff) are feasible. ECDSA is just an example they chose. Also, Curve25519 is only side-channel resistant to timing side-channels, this does NOT protect it in any way against the EM side-channels exploited in this paper. You can't expect the authors to go over every possible curve out there.
It's great to see this kind of work published. It is worth noting however that the US government is well aware of these kind of attacks. The Snowdon docs show that the CIA have been performing side-channel analysis since 2012 on the Iphone 4s and Ipad 2: https://theintercept.com/2015/03/10/ispy-cia-campaign-steal-...

Cryptography Research demonstrated this on an ipod in 2011: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4L8rnYhnLt8

In any case, great stuff.