Re:ECDSA Key Extraction from Mobile Devices via Nonintrusive...
by ge0rg on Friday March 04, 2016 @12:52PM
(#11225486)
I'm only a crypto hobbyist, so I haven't followed the field (side-channel attacks on ECC) too closely. Still, the authors themselves address ECC and not jus ECDSA in the related work section, and I considered Curve/Ed-25519 to be a sufficiently important contribution to the field to at least mention it.
One way or the other, this is really impressive work and it shows yet another reason to avoid ECDSA, unless you are a crypto rocket surgeon.
Re:ECDSA Key Extraction from Mobile Devices via Nonintrusive...
by tptacek on Friday March 04, 2016 @01:00PM
(#11225558)
Again: Ed25519 isn't ECDSA. Not just different curves, but different signature constructions. Curve25519 and ECDSA are orthogonal. I'd have disagreed with your comment even if you had said "Ed25519" instead of "Curve25519", but I especially disagree with the comment you actually wrote.
Re:ECDSA Key Extraction from Mobile Devices via Nonintrusive...
by ge0rg on Friday March 04, 2016 @01:45PM
(#11225911)
Thanks for the clarification. While I am aware that Curve25519 is not Ed25519 is not ECDSA, they all at least belong into the field of Elliptic Curve Cryptography. It is hard for an outsider to tell how wide a certain sub-field is, and how far the related work research should go. I merely took the hints from the paper, which addressed ECC in some places, and wrongfully concluded that DJB's research would be still on topic.
I don't know that it's typical for research like this to comprehensively evaluate targets that aren't relevant to the research. Regardless, here we have an attack on the ECDSA k-nonce. People who use Curve25519 don't even use ECDSA; they use Ed25519's deterministic Schnorr-style signatures. It's not even the same signature construction.
So what you're asking of the authors seems a bit like the authors of the DROWN paper explaining that their RSA padding oracle attack doesn't work if you instead use DH key agreement.