An interesting phenomenon like this played out in EVE online where an economist independently re-discovered the land tax: http://www.gamasutra.com/blogs/RaminShokrizade/20130405/1899...
It is possible to speculate without holding productive land out of use: You buy it and then rent it out. Which land value tax would presumably have little effect on (except insofar as it increases sprawl and therefore reduces city center land values) because the tax would be passed on to the renter(s).
The reason people buy land in cities and then don't use it for anything is often because they own enough other property in the same city that withdrawing rental units from the market will increase the rents for the other units by enough that the strategy is net profitable. Which seems like it ought to be illegal, but anything nefarious that has the consequence of increasing property values tends to get overlooked "for some reason."
false:
http://kaalvtn.blogspot.co.uk/2013/01/g-lvt-would-benefit-ri...
Because the housing market is extremely efficient. Rents are essentially property value * current interest rate + taxes + property maintenance costs. But rents are also set from the other side by what renters can afford to pay. So if you increase the tax, the property value goes down to compensate. Anyone who buys the property after the tax is already in place is unaffected.
So there are two ways of looking at it. One is the renter pays the tax (i.e. the formula for rent has "the entire amount of taxes on the property" as a component) and the other is the tax is paid entirely by whoever owned the property when the tax was enacted, via a large reduction in property value. It depends which point in time you're looking at it, the moment when the tax is enacted or rent paid by tenants in the future as a percentage of then-present property values.
But in any case the tax isn't paid by speculators who didn't already own the property in year zero of the tax being enacted.
If a georgist LVT were assessed accurately, the rental income of unimproved land would equal the tax.
Thus there would be no point in speculation. If the land value went up so would the tax and vice versa.
Which brings up a good question. There are plenty of places where there is a 50-unit ten-story apartment building on a lot of about the same size as the surrounding single family homes, e.g. because the houses have yards and the apartment building fills the entire lot. So what is the assessed value of the "land" supposed to be then? If it's anything the owners of the single family homes could afford then it wouldn't make the slightest dent in the rents collected by the owner of the apartment building.
It's actually a very hard problem. Because in theory any of the home owners could build a large apartment building on their lot and be collecting large rents but if they all did that then rents in that area would crash. But the land is equivalent between the apartment buildings and single family homes, so they "should" all be assessed at the same value.
Congratulations, you just defined "fighting over scraps".
>Which brings up a good question. There are plenty of places where there is a 50-unit ten-story apartment building on a lot of about the same size as the surrounding single family homes, e.g. because the houses have yards and the apartment building fills the entire lot. So what is the assessed value of the "land" supposed to be then?
The assessed value of the land of your next door neighbor will be similar to yours.
If you're asking how it's calculated, check the wikipedia page (the answer is multivariate analysis using property sales).
The difference in rents between a single family house and a multi-story apartment building is "scraps"?
Keep in mind that there is such a thing as market saturation. If there are already as many rental units in an area as their are prospective tenants, the value of land that "could" have an apartment building built on it is not anything like the value of the adjacent land that already has an apartment building on it, because actually building more apartment buildings would oversaturate the market and drive rents into the floor. So nobody will be willing to do that, even if the same person would spend even more money to buy one of the existing apartment buildings which doesn't increase the local supply of rental units.
> If you're asking how it's calculated, check the wikipedia page (the answer is multivariate analysis using property sales).
That's... what? You can't use property sales to calculate a tax which is supposed to devour the rent value of land. The sale price will have the tax built into it. If you have the tax calibrated correctly the sale price of an unimproved lot should be zero dollars and the sale price of a lot with a building should be only the value of the building.
And you couldn't even calculate it using the fact that someone paying money for land indicates that it's under-assessed, because if that was expected to work then no one would ever pay more than $0 as the value of unimproved land even if the current assessment was low, based on the expectation that the assessment will soon become accurate. But if no one is ever paying more than $0 as the value of unimproved land then what are you going to base your estimate on?
No, but if the land is densely populated and high value the potential stream of rental income from building an average house will be lower than the land taxes and you'll lose money building it.
"Scraps" is what speculating over the value of that housing will get you when the only rents to be derived are from the value you create as a property developer.
>And you couldn't even calculate it using the fact that someone paying money for land indicates that it's under-assessed, because if that was expected to work then no one would ever pay more than $0 as the value of unimproved land
Well, that's the point isn't it? If somebody does pay more than $0 for unimproved land (or land with buildings that are worth $0), that's a data point that you can use to adjust your model.
The net effect on land use would be to sort land use into ... appropriately priced bands of use. People would, IMO, be less likely to spend as much time and energy in tax avoidance.
The initial concept of the income tax was very loosely based on Georgist taxation - if someone has a high income, chances are it's based on rents. It's a noisy, distorted measurement and asking people their income, is, frankly, rude.
If a Georgist tax replaced an income tax, then those who produce without charging rents would have an advantage. The theory goes than income that is not rents is consumer surplus. And you stop taxing labor.
If you think of people who work as service personnel as subsidizing those who own land in SanFran or NYC with their labor, then I think this gets clearer. If the landowners rather than the laborers paid the taxes, it seems much more equitable.
1: you'd still pay some tax, which would be in direct proportion to the amount of public goods your land consumed (henry george theorem)
2: the whole point is to shift the tax burden from labor (productive) to those who extract economic rent (drain on the economy)
Given that employees/retail customers would no longer have to pay income tax that same amount of money would be available for land lords to charge as increased rent or retailers in increased prices.
I really fail to see how in a realistic scenario that this really changes anything at all. I would hazard a guess that this would likely be the most regressive tax code we've seen in modern history as large landowners would charge everyone roughly what they are being charged now plus what they customarily pay in income tax, and then likely distribute their own tax burden amongst the tenants.
As a high income earner I whole heartedly support the idea that only land should be taxed, but I don't think it's going to play out like everyone thinks it will, given that land is not a particularly large store of wealth, 200 / 3000 trillion, or about 6%
I think the only thing this tax code would do is encourage wealthy people to build very tall towers and farms in remote areas, and sell each other their property at dirt cheap prices. Vertical farming would also probably become a thing.
Currently: taxes are based on land+improvements
Proposed: taxes are based on land
Factories move because the value of their land is high under the current system as well.
The problem with the current system is that it disincentizes improvements. In my neighborhood of Boston, most of the 100-year old buildings used to be 5 stories. Now they are 3 stories. What happened? People literally dismantled the upper level floors of their buildings to reduce their taxes. In other parts of the country, it is fairly common to tear down a building to reduce the taxes on an unused property. That is what a land tax is designed to eliminate.
The question is, should we have more property/land value tax and less sales/income tax or more sales/income tax and less property/land value tax?
Some claim that to be the primary function of government but it certainly isn't the primary element of the government budget.
> And theoretically, people would then be forced to productive investment rather than land speculation.
Thwarting land speculation is literally the same thing as not allowing land values to increase. LVT reduces land values because of the overhang of the future tax payments, but it also has various negative consequences. If you want to keep land values down, enact policies that encourage the construction and occupation of high density housing. In particular, don't explicitly impede it through zoning regulations etc.
The improvements - buildings, the like - are still yours. The only thing that is taxed is the increase in value due to position of the land, due to proximity to other such improvements.
In other words, from the perspective of the land owner, the land value doesn't increase because the added value goes to the tax collector instead of the land owner. Which is true for both the owner/seller and prospective buyers of the land, so the value (meaning market value) of the land doesn't go up. Assuming the tax is perfectly calibrated and the land value estimate is correct before the existence of the tax reduces the market value of the land.
Here's the problem right now. Rents are too damn high and people can't afford to live in the city. You pass the land value tax and land market values decrease accordingly because property buyers won't pay as much for land they can't collect as much rent from. But the rents are still too damn high, they're just going to the tax collector instead of the land owner. And people can't build new housing to alleviate the high rents for the same reason they don't already, because zoning regulations prohibit it.
Suppose instead we change zoning regulations to allow builders to build several dozen new 50 story skyscrapers full of residential housing in the city. Supply goes up, price goes down. So property values go down and rents go down and now people can afford housing. How is that not better? It gives the "rents" to the tenants instead of the tax collector.
Hopefully, the rents that are too damn high go to the tax collector instead of an income tax. There is the Henry George "theorem" which states that land rents are always equal to the cost of government.
Curiously, I don't really know how this interacts with zoning. I suspect zoning would be completely different if there was no influence from land speculation.
I don't hold Geotaxation to be utopian. It's just interesting. Might be an improvement.
In theory. In practice the problem is that it gives governments a vested interest in rents remaining high to maintain their tax base, which makes them avoid policies that would lower rents (and thus the government's share thereof). But maintaining high rents is extremely regressive, regardless of whether the money goes to the government, because rents are paid like a poll tax.
> There is the Henry George "theorem" which states that land rents are always equal to the cost of government.
Things like that are weird because they have the potential to be "true" since a more prosperous country can afford to spend more on both government and housing, but then what is supposed to follow from that?
> Curiously, I don't really know how this interacts with zoning. I suspect zoning would be completely different if there was no influence from land speculation.
Well, it would turn the government into the land speculator, so they would be the ones trying to keep land values high and generate artificial scarcity.
If taxes are too high here, I can move. That sets a mechanism for keeping equilibrium in prices.
Couldn't you say the same thing about rent, under the current system? If rents are too high, people can move to Des Moines or wherever; that fact hasn't made many people feel ok about how high the rents are (because of course not all places you could live are equally desirable).
EDIT: slightly reworded.
Factories usually push down the value of land. Who wants to be next to a smokestack?
>Anything that doesn't actually care about its location but attracts other investment would keep getting moved
Which is all very well, except there basically isn't anybody who doesn't care about location and attracts investment. Location is important for everybody.
Factory workers. Then service workers who sell their food and cut their hair. Then doctors and nurses and police and firefighters and so on who are needed wherever people are concentrated. How do you think places go from being an empty field to a town?
> Which is all very well, except there basically isn't anybody who doesn't care about location and attracts investment. Location is important for everybody.
Then why do Boeing and Ford and GE build their factories in rural areas instead of in Manhattan?
Except factories need workers too, and workers need haircuts so it doesn't make sense for a factory to be built in the middle of nowhere where there are no workers.
>How do you think places go from being an empty field to a town?
Rarely.
>Then why do Boeing and Ford and GE build their factories in rural areas instead of in Manhattan?
Boeing's factory is within easy commuting distance of Everett. GE's is in Flint. Neither one was built in rural Iowa or the Mojave.
They're not built in Manhattan because that would be prohibitively expensive given the amount of space they need.
The biggest problem I see with it is not so much that it can't be made into a workable way of allocating land - it might even be good at that. But that it only catches value changes to the land, and we're going through a period where e.g. in IT the value creation is less and less dependent on land and more and more fluid.
VCs are unwilling to supply funding if they cannot drop by and see all their employees at work, it seems.
So you have somebody who is going to build a factory and they pick a nice piece of low value rural land. But once there is a factory, people build housing for the workers and stores and so on, and now you have a whole town centered on the factory and the value of the land goes up. But the reason the value of the land goes up is because of the factory.
So the next thing you know the factory owners realize they're sitting on a "high value" piece of land, so they put all the machinery on trucks and carry it fifty miles down the road where the land is still cheap and they don't have to pay high taxes. And then the process repeats.
It seems like the result would be a preposterous amount of urban sprawl and inefficiency. Anything that doesn't actually care about its location but attracts other investment would keep getting moved, which would destroy the value of the third party investment.
Third parties would then respond by making their investments mobile (e.g. living in mobile homes or selling food from food trucks instead of building houses or restaurants). Every time the taxing authority said the piece of land where everybody is has significantly more value than the piece where nobody is, everything moves down the road again.
And that's the extreme case but you get the same thing in the suburbs. You don't want a house which is near anything because the land value will be higher which is now a liability, so build it a little further out and you'll have a longer commute but your taxes will go down by $10,000/year.
Because it isn't the land that has value, it's the people and the stuff. If you tax land highly non-uniformly then the people and stuff will spread out.