It becomes non-trivial due to the marketing of their devices as secure systems. Just as with the burden of proof in defamation actions is higher in the case of a public figures, the "triviality" of the modification in this case is held to a higher standard due to the purpose of the product.

* I can't reply below this threshold but I'm enjoying the back and forth. People buy iphones because they believe that there are no ways to "trivially" access their personal information. Even for Apple to do so would be a breach of that trust. See: "Uber God Mode"

Apple can't access your personal information unless they are in physical possession of the phone. And, whether they have built the GovOS piece of software already or not, is essentially irrelevant to how easy it is.

If the only reason they can't get at your data is because they haven't compiled some code yet that's ALMOST NO PROTECTION AT ALL! Anyone making a buying decision based on Apple's failure to compile a simple piece of code is nuts!

Like, if you gave me a private document while I had my eyes closed and I said "Trust me, I can't see your data, I have my eyes closed. And I'm not going to open them." that would be crazy right? Building GovOS is the equivalent of opening my eyes.

I think you underestimate the value of trust in business and government. Its a common failing in the hacker ethos. Just because you CAN mess with the programming of an elevator the president uses every day doesn't mean you SHOULD.

People buy iPhones because they think that the FBI can't ever compel Apple to extract data from them?

And even if that's true (which I really don't think it is) it's not a good enough reason.

Say I started a bank and marketed my bank as an especially secure one. "Even the FBI will never be able to see your bank records. I won't let them!" I bet some customers might be interested in that. Just because I had marketed my bank that way doesn't mean my bank would gain some special legal protection against warrants.

The big difference between the two is that the banks have the information and are already subject to lots of record keeping regulations and so it is not an undue burden for them to comply with a subpoena demanding information. Apple does not currently have what the FBI is asking for and to comply would mean creating that software.

If the government wants to pass a law requiring phone makers like Apple to include a back door, then that's what they should do.

For me, this boils down to whether or not people are allowed to have strong encryption.

> For me, this boils down to whether or not people are allowed to have strong encryption.

Its easy to see why DOD originally classified it as a munition. Video games have become a powerful tool for storytelling, education, performance art, and immersive experiences for a long time but they started out as artillery simulators and a means to practice war games. That mentality pervades and we still see Jump, Shoot, and Run as the primary dynamic by which we function in these amazing experiences. You're fighting against human instinct and hundreds of thousands of years of evolution. Against Dunbar's number, the core mechanic of trust and social engagement for millenia. I hope you're right, but I don't think it will be the sea-change you're expecting. Look at the adoption of bitcoin and remember that law enforcement is a retro-grade function of society. Underfunded and always behind the zeitgeist.

We don't ask the secret service to build the president's merchandising website, and we shouldn't expect the FBI to be able to articulate or comprehend the, "triviality" of undermining strong encryption.

I think it was classified as a munition for practical reasons - they wanted export controls.

I think it's great that you name specific parts of the government because not all parts of the government think strong encryption is a problem.

All I'm concerned about is a bottle. Take a little walk to the edge of town across the track. Where the viaduct looms as it shifts and cracks. Where the border lies. Across the stack. On a gathering storm comes a handsome man with a red right hand.

4PM in Chicago. I'm out of here.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EdhoX1Xu6ZI

> For me, this boils down to whether or not people are allowed to have strong encryption.

That's an absurd point of view because the phone in question doesn't have strong encryption(1). If it did, there would be no way for Apple to trivially bypass it.

(1) Well it kind of does but by encouraging the use of an incredibly weak password it defeats the purpose of having any encryption at all really. If the San Bernardino shooters had used a real password we wouldn't be having this discussion.

We have no idea what kind of password is set on that phone. If the shooter used a good password (he probably didn't), then no matter what Apple does, the FBI is still going to be locked out.

The chance of there being anything valuable on that phone is pretty slim. Especially when you consider how much the government is willing to spend on it. I was just watching CNN and Apple has apparently detailed what it would take before they would consider writing the compromised version of the OS. The reporter claims it would cost about $50 million and the government has apparently said "no problem, we can pay that". Ugh.

I won't cost 50 million dollars to comment out a few lines of code and recompile the OS. That reporter has no idea what they're talking about.

To be fair, neither do you.

Sure I do. I've been a professional programmer for almost 20 years. I have a pretty good idea about what sorts of things are hard to do and what sorts of things are easy to do. The FBI's requests are very easy. 50M is ~200 man years of work. That number is insane.

Have you ever worked some place that requires a security clearance?

Well, for Apple to develop this software, they would insist on it being developed in a locked down facility that doesn't currently exist (what Apple has is in use). I think they have said it's only about $100,000 of developer time (so maybe 2-3 months of work), but the infrastructure that would be necessary for the work to be done in a way that doesn't risk any leaks is expensive.

Can you make up some more facts about Apple's real estate situation and software methodology?