Re:A Technical Perspective on the Apple iPhone Case
by muddi900 on Friday February 19, 2016 @11:46PM
(#11138888)
According to Apple's own whitepaper one the topic, the pin only used to hash the class key, not the encryption key itself.
Re:A Technical Perspective on the Apple iPhone Case
by abalone on Friday February 19, 2016 @11:37PM
(#11138853)
Perhaps the key could be extracted by physically analyzing the chip, e.g. grinding it down and using microscopic tools to detect state?
Re:A Technical Perspective on the Apple iPhone Case
by akiselev on Saturday February 20, 2016 @01:02AM
(#11139109)
Secure chips that store private keys generally keep them on a part of the silicon die that can't be analyzed like the rest of the chip. Any attempt to open the chip package (take off the black plastic/epoxy covering the die) results in the destruction of the secure region and methods of reading state in semiconductors (using electron microscopy) require you to somehow expose the silicon holding the private key.
Re:A Technical Perspective on the Apple iPhone Case
by tedd4u on Saturday February 20, 2016 @03:55AM
(#11139444)
Apparently this iPhone 5C pre-dates the "Secure Enclave." So the key is somewhere else. Possibly a place vulnerable to a physical readout, possibly not.
Re:A Technical Perspective on the Apple iPhone Case
by abalone on Saturday February 20, 2016 @03:28AM
(#11139389)
Interesting, how does that work exactly? I would've thought with an accurate map of the chip package and a precise grinder you could shave off just what you wanted to expose.
I mean it might take a lot of practice but if you have the time and money and chip samples to practice on...
Re:A Technical Perspective on the Apple iPhone Case
by Crito on Friday February 19, 2016 @11:53PM
(#11138916)
Perhaps, but that is a destructive option that is very risky.
Re:A Technical Perspective on the Apple iPhone Case
by ysv2 on Friday February 19, 2016 @11:15PM
(#11138794)
Thanks for the explanation.
Re:A Technical Perspective on the Apple iPhone Case
by MCRed on Saturday February 20, 2016 @12:13AM
(#11138973)
10k distinct combinations-- if, and only iff, they used a 7 digit all numeric pin. The odds of this are not bad for most people, but in this case the person who had this phone has shown better than the average criminals level of OpSec.
One thing is for sure- for phones with TouchID where you only need to enter the pin on reboot, it makes sense to make the pin something other than numeric and longer than 4 digits.
Re:A Technical Perspective on the Apple iPhone Case
by nnx on Saturday February 20, 2016 @09:24AM
(#11140109)
iirc iOS 9 now requires 6 digits passcode on devices with TouchID.
Re:A Technical Perspective on the Apple iPhone Case
by nacs on Saturday February 20, 2016 @05:48PM
(#11142342)
Not true -- 4 digit passcodes work just fine (and are default) on Touch ID phones.
Re:A Technical Perspective on the Apple iPhone Case
by nnx on Sunday February 21, 2016 @09:18AM
(#11144553)
"The default for passcodes on your Touch ID–enabled iPhone and iPad is now six digits instead of four." ~ http://www.apple.com/ios/whats-new/
Removing the storage chips from the device would mean breaking a very strong key, perhaps 128-bit AES, which is not a desirable offline brute-force attack.
That strong key is derived from the PIN combined with a unique device ID which cannot feasibly be extracted from the processor. So an offline attack needs to crack full AES, but an online attack by running modified OS code on the device itself means only the weak PIN needs to be attacked (just 10,000 distinct combinations, roughly equivalent to a 13 or 14 bit key).