If they really wanted that data, they could get it with their current capabilities. They don't really want that data; they want the legal precedent to compel companies to subvert their own security mechanisms, and they want to intimidate one of their harshest critics (Cook). That's part of their broader strategy; if we can compel you to break security you built, you build security you can't break. The next logical question is whether they can compel you to not build security mechanisms you cannot break in the first place. That's the legal question the FBI really wants to ask.
[1]http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2013-07/11/blackberry-in...
Examples include investigating the murder of the phone's owner, accessing financial information of a parent who has passed away, or recovering corporate passwords from the phone of an ex-employee who cannot be located or refuses to give them up.
So yes, there are many cases where all or most of us (even simultaneously) might want into a locked phone. But we're all worse off if it's possible.
If they lose and the media circus leads people to strongly believe that the iPhone is 100% secure while it really isn't - gaining the trust that was lost due to snowden - this is really useful both from surveillance point-of-view , from blocking access to foreign countries, and for helping the iPhone usage grow, especially among "important" users ,be they legal or illegal.
But just looking at what seems more valuable for the government ,it seems that the second option is far more valuable. So i wonder ,why do everybody automatically accept the first motive ?
I don't think this is it. IMO if they lose they will ask congress for a law to require backdoors because they have already shown that not having such a law helps terrorist.
If you don't trust the iPhone ,maybe ,for your important communications, you'll only use Qubes + Whonix + TOR ? write your own software in addition(as a rich terrorist org) ? use a machine not connected to the internet and pass files ? Be more careful in what you communicate over the phone ? etc..
This has nothing to do with capability, and everything to do with precedent
"RIM's carefully worded statements about BlackBerry security are designed to make their customers feel better, while giving the company ample room to screw them" - Bruce Schneier
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/08/uae_to_ban_bl...
If it has the access to offer then it seems to support the point.
Particularly: > RIM respects both the regulatory requirements of government and the security and privacy needs of corporations and consumers. While RIM does not disclose confidential regulatory discussions that take place with any government, RIM assures its customers that it is committed to continue delivering highly secure and innovative products that satisfy the needs of both customers and governments.
What happens when those needs are diametrically opposed?
I assume the actual request is more technical then, because the overview they gave here explains the things you would want to do if you knew nothing about the encryption and wanted to brute-force. Reduce password attempt timeouts, allow automating the password attempts, and don't melt-down after too many failures.