This is an analysis, not an objective and demonstrable fact.
I could just as well argue that yes, the FBI really does care a lot about this particular iPhone, and that's why the asked-for update is to be keyed to this iPhone and only this iPhone.
At the same time, even assuming that is true, we're talking about the FBI going through a legal process, reviewed by a judge, to get the data off one phone at a time. If that's how it works every time, I don't see a problem; that is how the system is supposed to work. I am kind of baffled as to why we're cheerleading the fact that Apple is refusing to perform what appears to be a perfectly reasonable request that is being made in accordance with the law. If you are operating under the presumption that the government is always a bad-faith actor, then we have much, much bigger problems.
Also, apparently this 'precedent' has already been set; according to a link in the article, Apple had previously offered custom firmware images to law enforcement after a court order that bypassed the lock screen on earlier iPhones.
http://www.cnet.com/news/how-apple-and-google-help-police-by...
Wasn't it just yesterday a story was published about an upcoming documentary about the STUXnet virus that claims that the US and Israel developed it in secret together and had a very successful, but very limited use for it. Only when Israel allegedly went off on their own to modify and deploy it did it spread wide and far, popping up on the radar of anti-malware companies and getting researched and publicized.
Like what you said, after the exploit/backdoor/software is designed, it can never be un-designed. It will exist as a tool that can only be mitigated, but not destroyed.
Then why don't we have Apple's private keys yet?
Plenty of companies keep a lot of things very secret, including things like powerful debug modes, for a long time. At least long enough that everybody forgets the details and the software has long since rotted away.
Nobody in FBI would give a damn about leaking the patched OS image: it's Apple's reputation on stake, not FBI's.
There is nothing of value for the FBI to leak.
This is the huge difference between this order (which I can live with) and blanket encryption backdoors using key escrow or other crap (which I'm absolutely vehemently against and willing to fight to the teeth)
That is completely not true. There is no way to make such a thing that can only work on one particular phone. There will be some point at which the compromised firmware image checks to see if it's that device, at which point it would be possible to change that to whatever device you want.
"This is the huge difference between this order (which I can live with) and blanket encryption backdoors using key escrow or other crap (which I'm absolutely vehemently against and willing to fight to the teeth)"
No, there is absolutely no difference between those two.
The technique that makes this possible is described in Apple's iOS Security White paper, page 6 ("System Software Authorization"): https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf
This mechanism explains why you can't take an old release of iOS off a different phone and copy it to yours.
Not LEOs.
No. You don't have to assume that law enforcement or intelligence agencies are bad faith actors to see they are constantly seeking to expand their powers.
http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/235910-fbis-hacking-...
https://www.eff.org/issues/national-security-letters
http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-fbi-using-d...
Given what we know about government surveillance programs, why would one assume the government is a good faith actor when it comes to encryption?
It needn't be "always", just (perceived as) too often. It seems fair to say the broad sentiment is that the national security arms of U.S. government have broached that barrier.
And how will we ensure that's the case? Once they have the firmware they need they can install it on other phones.
For all we know so far, Apple could still provide a signed firmware bypassing the bruteforcing delay implemented by the Secure Enclave.
Probably not easy and not on mass scale. It may even need to have to see inside the silicone itself. Which is expensive and hard. But as long as the keys are on the device or in possession of apple - they can be extracted.
Apple chose themselves to have total control over the device, signing and ecosystem - now it backfires.
The FBI is already paving that way with this case. They don't overly care about access to this particular iPhone. They're taking this case through the courts so that they can establish a precedent that allows them to force manufacturer cooperation to unlock any phone.
Edit: If they really cared about access to this individual phone, they wouldn't be going through the courts to get it; they'd be talking to the NSA TAO or other LEO with advanced forensic capability. As several people have pointed out, this iPhone 5C does not have a Secure Enclave and probably does not present a significant challenge to forensically analyze, to people that know what they're doing. They're going through the courts on this so they can get carte blanche to access iPhones 5S and above, which no LEO currently has capabilities to inspect.
Further edit: This is Farook's work phone. His main, personal phone was found destroyed in a dumpster near the site of the attacks. I find it incredibly unlikely the FBI really cares much about the contents of this individual phone, they just want a high-profile test case to expand their surveillance capabilities.