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Re:Unix Delenda Est (2015) by anthk on Saturday January 09, 2016 @10:08PM (#10873962)
>Sandboxes make a much better security primitive than sudo, file permissions, etc. which are useless for protecting a single user’s data.

Is not only sudo, but sudo AND polkit. Are you sure you know what are you talking about?

And about your sensitive data, AppArmor is more than capable. For the other sensitive data, create a folder out of /home and "chattr +i" your content recursively, giving proper permissions first.

And you rely in Plan9 for your speech, which is more UNIXy than UNIX and everything IS a filesystem in a more hardcore way (something you look as obsolete), altough factotum and namespaces are a complete different beast.

Re:Unix Delenda Est (2015) by rwmj on Sunday January 10, 2016 @08:57AM (#10875304)
I don't think anyone is disputing that Linux has many encrusted layers of permissions systems, some of them Turing complete. And a terrible reporting mechanism -- your system call returns -EPERM, now you have to work out which of the many layers you tripped over. Or you can try decoding audit.log or remember which of the many SELinux tools you need to invoke.

The question is if we can do better, and the answer is obviously yes because research OSes have existed for many years, like EROS, KeyKOS etc.

However rewriting all our software is not going to happen, so the question is how to get from where we are now to better systems.

Re:Unix Delenda Est (2015) by legulere on Sunday January 10, 2016 @12:01PM (#10875986)
Many unix systems are used by just one person (Desktops, Smartphones, Tablets). Most unix systems that are used by more people are servers and don't use the unix user system to discern between users.

The fewest unix systems out there have several users connecting to it with each user having a different unix user account. But exactly this is what the unix user system was designed - nothing else. Everything else like root or users for services is just a dirty hack, because unix wasn't designed to offer real isolation of applications.

AppArmor doesn't work because users creating profiles about what syscalls are allowed is out of touch with reality.

The only unix systems partially offering the isolation actually needed today are Android and iOS. You could still improve them massively though.

Re:Unix Delenda Est (2015) by bluejekyll on Sunday January 10, 2016 @12:09PM (#10876024)
Just because you don't have more than one "person" user on a system doesn't mean you don't have multiple users. The UNIX security model is based on user separation, and has been used in many server environments to define boundaries between different privileges on the system.

Security wouldn't be possible without this. You can also think of cgroups/lxc/docker as a direct extension of this.

Re:Unix Delenda Est (2015) by legulere on Sunday January 10, 2016 @01:02PM (#10876289)
> Security wouldn't be possible without this. You can also think of cgroups/lxc/docker as a direct extension of this.

I maybe didn't express myself clearly enough. The unix user system wasn't designed for the program isolation it is used for today, but for multi-user systems. The security model was to protect the system from users and users from each other.

Cgroups are certainly a move into the correct direction, because it's based on the assumption that programs are evil (either by design, or because they get exploited). When you correctly sandbox programs you won't need to run them as a different user anymore.

Re:Unix Delenda Est (2015) by spdionis on Sunday January 10, 2016 @01:04PM (#10876299)
How much simpler would OSes and security be if we threw away multiple users (and groups)?

I think we don't really need them. We only need 3 operating "modes" in 90% of the cases: normal, administrator, guest. And after that various per-application permissions a la Android or iOS.

We don't need multi-users systems.

Re:Unix Delenda Est (2015) by bluejekyll on Sunday January 10, 2016 @10:32PM (#10878617)
I think multi-user in this context is more about authorization of operations. It's correct that we don't need users/groups for this today, there are equally good things in cgroups and pam, but it's a simpler abstraction in many cases.

I think your mostly correct, but in most cases I would prefer individual authorization rules, like apparmor. There's always cases when you don't want to escalate the entire app to root level, but need something more than what's a normal mode.