Security wouldn't be possible without this. You can also think of cgroups/lxc/docker as a direct extension of this.
I maybe didn't express myself clearly enough. The unix user system wasn't designed for the program isolation it is used for today, but for multi-user systems. The security model was to protect the system from users and users from each other.
Cgroups are certainly a move into the correct direction, because it's based on the assumption that programs are evil (either by design, or because they get exploited). When you correctly sandbox programs you won't need to run them as a different user anymore.
I think we don't really need them. We only need 3 operating "modes" in 90% of the cases: normal, administrator, guest. And after that various per-application permissions a la Android or iOS.
We don't need multi-users systems.
I think your mostly correct, but in most cases I would prefer individual authorization rules, like apparmor. There's always cases when you don't want to escalate the entire app to root level, but need something more than what's a normal mode.
The fewest unix systems out there have several users connecting to it with each user having a different unix user account. But exactly this is what the unix user system was designed - nothing else. Everything else like root or users for services is just a dirty hack, because unix wasn't designed to offer real isolation of applications.
AppArmor doesn't work because users creating profiles about what syscalls are allowed is out of touch with reality.
The only unix systems partially offering the isolation actually needed today are Android and iOS. You could still improve them massively though.