Do you terminate SSL or something on yours? Or have open unauthenticated services running on your internal network? If not, what's the actual threat here?
- Controlling the networking equipment can open you up to things like sslstrip
My strategy with IPMI has been to assign IPMI non-routable, private IP addresses, then block that address space at the interior of the network (which is sort of redundant) and then require folks to SSH onto an interior host and connect to IPMI that way.
I would be very interested in, and receptive to, criticisms of this model ...
In a high security situation I'd keep the IPMI network physically segregated, with a small number of machines acting as access to it. Or maybe connect IPMI only within each (locked) rack, and require using something like ansible if you want to perform an operation across more than one rack. Whether the cost/benefit fits for your circumstances is another question of course.
Your threat model is also missing the fact that a network can mitm your connections and also silently duplicate sensitive traffic.
If JunOS gets a bulletin, shit, that's really, really bad.
I feel it's very likely that the NSA had something to do with the recent Cisco ROMMON "discoveries", so it would not surprise me one iota if they were involved here as well (although it's obviously pretty early to speculate on something like that -- and impossible to {dis}prove).
Given ASAs run a 2.6 kernel that's not hard. From my Kiwicon 8 notes on Alec Stuart-Muirk's talk:
* Literally every protocol handler has CVEs against it.
* Every time Cisco add a new one it gets at least a DOS CVE. (There are some proofs of concept for pivoting these into real exploits on other Cisco products.)
* The ASA’s high availability protocols are unauthenticated and unencrypted. This is bad. Like, “will accept any packet claiming to be a management packet as valid” bad.
* Some authentication is optionally available, but if you enable it, the ASA will still accept unauthenticated protocols.
[1] https://ruxcon.org.au/assets/2014/slides/Breaking%20Bricks%2...
After hearing about "SYNful Knock" recently, I'm inclined to believe this even more.
Junos (FreeBSD) is the Routing Engine; Juniper hardware also contains an ASIC-based Packet Forwarding Engine, which loads microcode from the Routing Engine upon boot. Not everything's in Junos all the time, but since the PFE loads its embedded OS from the Routing Engine kernel, you could just pwn the Routing Engine and then also have some sense of persistence in the PFE on reboot, probably. I don't know much about how the PFEs work internally.
I'm certainly no FreeBSD/JunOS expert. I am an unabashed fanboy of JunOS's *nix-y structure, though, vs. the monolithic binary that is IOS. (There was a great Blackhat 2011 talk on IOS reverse engineering, if you are interested in that sort of thing. [1])
[1] [PDF Warning] https://media.blackhat.com/bh-eu-11/Sebastian_Muniz/BlackHat...
And of course it doesn't have to be NSA. Maybe some foreign spies or pretty much anybody interested in spying on some Juniper's customers.
Or even a bored employee doing it for bragging rights. FWIW, I once worked for a (reasonably big) corp making software which has to run as root and I'm pretty sure I'd have been able to slip some small privilege escalation backdoor in there if I felt like doing so. But I have to admit that their products weren't as security critical (and, actually, already had some vulns), so one could hope that Juniper and Cisco are better than that.
What's the point of locking your front door and leaving the window open?
If you're just going to run it in a VM, you'd be better off with more established things like OpenBSD, OpenWRT, pfSense, Cumulus VX, or even just a Debian VM with Quagga.
<disclosure>I'm CTO of Cumulus, whose network OS is exactly as open-source as OpenSwitch: everything but the single user-space program that links to Broadcom's SDK.</disclosure>
Of course they don't publish it as open source. But if you buy their chips, they will, I assume. So then you can write your own driver.
>If you're just going to run it in a VM, you'd be better off with more established things like OpenBSD, OpenWRT, pfSense, Cumulus VX, or even just a Debian VM with Quagga.
I agree. My VM scenario was meant only to illustrate that OpenSwitch is really easy to run in a container/VM, and that fact can be used to examine it for any malovalent behavior.
Only when the public can view (ALL) the code, rebuild it, and install it on their own hardware can we be reasonably confident it has not been tampered with.
I'm semi-responsible for some Juniper gear, thankfully all Junos (BSD) based, but I no longer trust any of it if this is malicious injection vs. a bad review. However, what the hell can I do? I can't audit the code. I trusted Juniper, and now I'm stuck with that trust being burned. Running to any other proprietary network vendor is just as uncertain.
If Junos gets a bulletin, I have a lot of work on my hands very soon, as do a good chunk of service providers. I remember there being rumors of a certain three-letter agency saying they had some type of exploit for the Cisco ASA as well; I wonder if it was something this deep, vs. just a run of the mill RCE vuln.
This is one more reason to use open-source products for actually security-sensitive systems, maintain a good amount of defense in depth, and do a little bit of auditing of the code you're using yourself. More often than not these days, it sure pays to be paranoid.
EDIT: At the same time, this also really makes me respect Juniper more than I have previously. A company that finds this internally, on their own audit, could have patched it silently and said nothing about it to anybody. It probably would have been better for them PR-wise. The honesty is worth me not jumping ship to another (probably compromised) proprietary vendor, but you betcha if I can get away with it, I'll run something open-source and community audited when I can.