Re:Summon – Get Your Secrets into Source Control
by patio11 on Friday December 04, 2015 @03:45PM
(#10679009)
We use Vault so that our Rails et al passwords can get written by Ansible scripts without any repo having all the keys to our kingdom in plain text. Ease of use decently high, particularly once you standardize on a way to communicate secrets to arbitrary systems. (Ours is "Assume you pervasively have access to secrets via environment variables. The sole source of truth for them is in the Ansible repo.")
Edit to add: it occurs to me, not for the first time, that I assumed Ansible Vault was Vault by Hashicorp simply because so much of our Devops stack is from Hashicorp.
Re:Summon – Get Your Secrets into Source Control
by gingerlime on Friday December 04, 2015 @05:02PM
(#10679493)
I do appreciate the simplicity (and effectiveness) of this wrapper, and I would definitely recommend this much simpler approach over a more robust tool in many situations.
I think the added value (and increased complexity) from tools like this is that allow you to store your secrets not only on the filesystem, but also in various (typically external) vaults. Some also provide more granular access control to only a subset of secrets, revocation and so on.
Re:Summon – Get Your Secrets into Source Control
by Skunkleton on Friday December 04, 2015 @03:33PM
(#10678942)
Also, /proc/<pid>/environ. There are rules on who owns this file (root, or the executing user) based on the suid bit. Regardless, you are now depending on linux permissions to protect your secrets, which begs the question: Why not just trust the filesystem? Even if /proc/<pid>/environ didn't exist, you could go through /proc/<pid>/mem to find secrets.
It seems that this is designed to protect you from untrusted execution environments, which I don't see as feasible. What am I missing?
Re:Summon – Get Your Secrets into Source Control
by jessaustin on Friday December 04, 2015 @04:51PM
(#10679415)
ISTM secrets should mostly be generated where they're needed and should not leave that location. If two locations need to interact then use asymmetric keys so that the public key may be shared. Of course such a system must be bootstrapped, but suitable arrangements will make that a relatively rare manual process.
Of course exceptions might be made for any number of operational reasons but I think it helps to at least aim for the right thing even if it isn't always possible. Secrets in VCS seems to be a shot in exactly the opposite direction.
Re:Summon – Get Your Secrets into Source Control
by jessaustin on Monday December 07, 2015 @11:01AM
(#10690197)
Haha it seems the motto should instead be "get some pointers to your secrets into source control". This makes the tool much less vulnerable to the abuse I was envisioning, but also pushes it into "so what?" territory for me. I can already save pointers to secrets in my code; this is another layer of configuration for dubious benefit.
Re:Summon – Get Your Secrets into Source Control
by kgilpin on Monday December 14, 2015 @01:33PM
(#10732825)
Summon also fetches the secrets out of the backend in a provider neutral way; it's well documented; and it ensures that secrets stay off persistent disks. So those are the reasons to use it. It's better for the world if there are a smaller number of doing the same things.
* Vault (by Hashicorp) [go] https://hashicorp.com/blog/vault.html
* Confidant (by Lyft) [Python] https://eng.lyft.com/announcing-confidant-an-open-source-sec...
* Keywhiz (by Sqaure) [Java] https://square.github.io/keywhiz/
Edit to add: it occurs to me, not for the first time, that I assumed Ansible Vault was Vault by Hashicorp simply because so much of our Devops stack is from Hashicorp.
I think the added value (and increased complexity) from tools like this is that allow you to store your secrets not only on the filesystem, but also in various (typically external) vaults. Some also provide more granular access control to only a subset of secrets, revocation and so on.
For example, S3 credentials, or the API secret to an external service (that may have been rotated since the last time you pulled).
Meaning that every child process will subsequently have access to the secrets?
It seems that this is designed to protect you from untrusted execution environments, which I don't see as feasible. What am I missing?
Shared web hosting where you share a physical machine with other users. Not everyone is into the VM craze these days, thank god
Environment variables should not be used to share secrets.
Of course exceptions might be made for any number of operational reasons but I think it helps to at least aim for the right thing even if it isn't always possible. Secrets in VCS seems to be a shot in exactly the opposite direction.