What I find really disgusting is that they had backup BACKUP generators trucked in and they couldn't use them because the plugs didn't match up. IT'S A FREAKING NUCLEAR POWER PLANT! DO YOUR JOB, CUT THE CONNECTORS OFF AND MAKE A CONNECTION! Literally EVERY ONE of the people who worked there are directly involved in the power generation business and they couldn't make a wonky connection work? If that's not in the top 10 completely preventable disasters of the century I don't know what is.
This just completely blows my mind. It is literally the worst vertical level they could have put them!
I guess they took defence in depth a bit too literally...
But what's inexcusable is allowing a reactor to melt down because you don't know how to cut connectors off of cables and do makeshift splices.
How many people will end up dying because someone wasn't willing to take a little risk? I mean, what's the worst that could happen? It'd work for a while and then fall apart? It'd blow up your generators? The worst-case scenario is that the nuclear reactor melts down which is what happens if you don't create a makeshift splice. So you have nothing to lose.
I'm obviously armchair quarterbacking this, but I can't see the argument against just trying something and hoping it works.
This part uses scare quotes to describe the 'quality' of the work:
Its initial application was based on the 3.122 m measurement local tsunami height (above Onahama Peil (O.P.) reference sea level), observed during the 1960 Great Chilean tsunami at or close to Fukushima [32]. The flooding estimate was provided to the nearest millimetre, underscoring a false sense of accuracy in the safety assessment that is impossible even today. With hindsight, it also underscores the ‘quality’ of the engineering work and of its review.
They're not "scare quotes", to quote you. They're direct quotations, for emphasis.
Interestingly, while the Onagawa NPP was also hit by a tsunami of approximately the same height as Dai-ichi, it survived the event ‘remarkably undamaged’.
But perhaps more importantly this is a great example of how complex these things can be. The "accepted methodology" and by that they mean the one the regulators hold them to, failed to consider a more geologically relevant time span (thousands of years versus hundreds of years).
My understanding of the situation was that the regulators said "Tell us you have accounted for tsunamis" and TEPCO said "We have, using the accepted methodology, here are the results."
So when did we know the methodology was wrong or insufficient? A lot of people had access to what TEPCO filed and their rationale over the 40+ years of operation. I'm interested if there was a concerted effort, pre-disaster, to get the methodology changed.
[1] "While the tsunami hazard assessment ha d been periodically updated at the Fukushima nuclear power plant taking into account the latest accepted methodology in Japan, the magnitude of the tsunami hazard was underestimated because it was based solely on historical data on relatively recent events (occurring within the past few hundred years). " -- https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/protection040912.pd...
Also, the 2007 journal paper that found insufficient protections at Fukushima: "The senior author of [46] was then a TEPCO scientist, while another two co-authors are two of the most senior tsunami engineers in Japan. We wonder how disappointed they must have been on 26 November 2010, when, in the symposium organized by JNES, they found out that TEPCO did not appear to have heeded their recommendations [46] in its re-assessment of Fukushima Dai-ichi"
I haven't read the whole report, these are just 2 that I picked up.
I find that hard to believe. It was the 4th largest earthquake in the last century and doesn't make the Wikipedia list of "Megatsunamis". It was more a question of how long between such extreme events than if such an extreme event could occur.
The analogy here is splashing your hand into water (megatsunami) versus moving your hand underwater.
1) Fukishima survived the earthquake as designed, and was in the process of shutting down when the tsunami hit.
2) The tsunami disabled primary and backup power to the cooling systems which was the proximate cause of the failure.
Further, at the time of its commissioning, the tsunami it experienced was accepted by the best engineering data at the time to be impossible.
You can make the argument that over time as more data became available the regulatory agency should have required additional upgrades to cover the larger tsunami risk. There have been plenty of stories about regulatory capture between TEPCO and the regulators which prevented best practices from being followed.
A lot of retrofits had been installed over time and that no doubt contributed to its survival of the earthquake.