The article talks about the Soloviev & Go catalogue how it wasn't taken into account: "Presumably on the basis of these studies, [Soloviev & Go] assigned it a tsunami intensity I=4, which is one of their highest values for Japan tsunamis. Yet, in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident, it has been argued repeatedly that the Jōgan tsunami had not been documented until 2001 [17], well after the design of the NPP"
Also, the 2007 journal paper that found insufficient protections at Fukushima: "The senior author of [46] was then a TEPCO scientist, while another two co-authors are two of the most senior tsunami engineers in Japan. We wonder how disappointed they must have been on 26 November 2010, when, in the symposium organized by JNES, they found out that TEPCO did not appear to have heeded their recommendations [46] in its re-assessment of Fukushima Dai-ichi"
I haven't read the whole report, these are just 2 that I picked up.
Re:The Fukushima accident was preventable
by maxerickson on Tuesday October 27, 2015 @12:33PM
(#10459140)
The article cites the safety culture at the company that runs the compared reactor and discusses how they went about deciding what sort of events they needed to plan for. They apparently knew what they were doing in 1968 and did not lean on passing the regulatory minimum (the reports cites later studies of how the plant is situated and the relative lack of damage from the 2011 tsunami).
But perhaps more importantly this is a great example of how complex these things can be. The "accepted methodology" and by that they mean the one the regulators hold them to, failed to consider a more geologically relevant time span (thousands of years versus hundreds of years).
My understanding of the situation was that the regulators said "Tell us you have accounted for tsunamis" and TEPCO said "We have, using the accepted methodology, here are the results."
So when did we know the methodology was wrong or insufficient? A lot of people had access to what TEPCO filed and their rationale over the 40+ years of operation. I'm interested if there was a concerted effort, pre-disaster, to get the methodology changed.
[1] "While the tsunami hazard assessment ha d been periodically updated at the Fukushima nuclear power plant taking into account the latest accepted methodology in Japan, the magnitude of the tsunami hazard was underestimated because it was based solely on historical data on relatively recent events (occurring within the past few hundred years). " -- https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/protection040912.pd...