If the test can't differentiate between QM interpretations, assuming some specific hypothetical interpretation is useless.
Let's start a thread where we talk about how tcp/ip works ... but with a twist. The only admissible references in the discussion are color pictures aimed at non-programmers. Anybody tries to talk about what actually works, we label them the "shut up and program" crowd and decry their lack of imagination.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_Broglie%E2%80%93Bohm_theory...
a) only testable with "unforeseeable future technology" and
b) whose "burden of an experimental proof lies with the opponents".
Win-Win there I think.
b) The link only says that some people have argued that position. I think all they're saying is that "wavefunction collapse caused by some arbitrary division between microscopic and macroscopic objects" is a stronger claim than MWI
OK. The actual quote from the linked reference was
"These proposals are all for gedanken experiments that cannot be performed with current or any foreseeable future technology".
So I took a little license in quoting. I should ha quoted it more correctly, you're quite right.
I think the best way to understand MWI is that a lot of physicists/philosophers are more comfortable with the idea of inhabiting an infinity of forking but "real" (essentially classical) universes than they are with inhabiting a single "unreal" universe in which QM is taken seriously.
That's a pretty uncharitable interpretation of it. If you look at the actual physics, MWI is incredibly simple: the wavefunction just evolves as the wavefunction evolves. That's it. There's some amplitude over here, and there's some amplitude over there, and this possibility and that possibility are mutually exclusive etc (with some "weird" quantum correlations, of course.)
The Copenhagen interpretation's "wavefunction collapse" is just like a Bayesian update -- the wavefunction you're left with is like a conditional probability. Maybe it makes you happy to throw away the "other universe" bits of the wavefunction and normalise probabilities on your own branch, but you obviously don't have to, and any discussion of when the collapse happens (or worse, whether it's a physical process that propagates across the universe faster than light) is obviously very silly business.
(Bell's theorem is basically maths to figure out if the photons have to 'know' the angle between the polarisers rather than just say start off with the same polarisation.)
So essentially you have an ever growing set of merging and splitting history branches, always growing for every point in space, continously.
I've got no idea how to make that work for your example of polarizers, or for the example of delayed quantum eraser experiments, etc... The surface of the bubbles apparantly have to carry all of that information and there must be some mechanism for them to decide which ones interact with which others.
It's possible though unlikely that they could be expanding no faster than the speed of a walking scientist - if nothing else in the universe is yet causally determined by the outcome.
It seems to me that you have a valve that instantly opens/close a different valve at an arbitrary distance.
You can see intuitively why this can't convey information. You always get both answers (in different "worlds").
It's "And to explain this, we postulate that a whole new universe appears fully formed out of nowhere, with an identical history but a distinguishable future, because it does."
I suppose it's possible. But it doesn't seem very parsimonious - because you effectively have to double the energy in the multiverse for every distinguishable quantum event.
Does conservation of energy not apply in the multiverse? Are universes - as many as you need - free at point of sale?
right?
Those words provoke little controversy when spoken about matter beyond the visible universe. Why? Because the simplest mathematical description we have of the objects we can see also includes those which in principle we cannot. We grant them the same ontological status as the Earth we stand on -- few would claim them as mere fictions to ease our task of prediction.
Occam's Razor properly applied limits the amount of information in the description, not the amount of things the description describes. For example, pi's infinite decimal expansion is spared by this information theoretic razor. If you reject the multiverse, your full description of the universe must contain one bit for every binary "choice" the universe made, every qubit that collapsed. Quite a few bits that turns out to be. The multiverse description suffers no such flaw, as it contains only the initial conditions and the rules by which those conditions change over time.
It doesn't create worlds. There's always only exactly one fuzzy-quantum-thing. It's just that some parts of it no longer interact with other parts of it.
Roughly: both the samples are in both world A (up/down) and world B(down/up), and when you interact with them, you get split and are pulled into both world A and world B, and each copy of you when you interact pulls the thing you interact with also into A and B, and so when you compare results, the A-you compares the A-result and the B-you compares the B-result.
The splitting is not immediate or faster than light. But it moves at exactly the speed of information, so you can't race ahead of it and watch it happen. To interact with it is to become part of it.