https://docs.sandstorm.io/en/latest/developing/security-prac...
That said, there is a cost in compatibility. Most apps can be made to run just fine in this constrained environment, but it does sometimes require tweaks. Docker is more interested in compatibility than in security, so naturally they don't do this kind of attack surface reduction by default. (You can configure it manually, but realistically if it isn't mandatory then few people will bother.)
https://www.joyent.com/blog/triton-docker-and-the-best-of-al...
I'd be curious if the Joyent folks believe Triton to have the security properties that everyone seems to want out of Docker. It doesn't involve the standard Docker daemon, so it might.
Yesterday at http://containersummit.io/, Bryan's talk "Going Container Native" (video coming soon) was in the same vein, SmartOS (illumos) directly benefits from its Solaris lineage -- Solaris Zones were engineered for security. We, Joyent, absolutely do believe Triton has the security properties that everyone seems to want out of Docker, because Joyent has been running OS containers in multi-tenant production since ~2006.
Open source SmartDataCenter [1], rebranded Triton, is the exact same code that is run in Joyent's Public Cloud. This truth in code, product and service contributed to me leaving an OpenStack company to join Joyent two years ago.
Defense in depth. With KVM, you'd have to exploit the guest kernel, then exploit KVM's hardware emulation to get to host userspace, then escalate to host root/kernel. (And KVM can use seccomp to limit itself, making that last step harder.) With Linux containers or Solaris Zones, you run directly on top of the host kernel, so you just need a single kernel exploit.
In any case, Zones and containers have the same security properties (running directly on top of the kernel), so the original comment about Zones being more secure than containers makes no sense.
Which is totally expected, because docker tries to be useful to the largest user-base possible. It would be quite harder to use if didn't support directory mounting (via -v). And it would be a total nightmare for almost every user if you had to specify a list of allowed syscalls for every container.
This reminds me the situation with SELinux a lot. It has improved a lot but I still see "disable SELinux" almost in every tutorial I read on CentOS, Fedora or RHEL.
Because security is hard.
Just look at the Mac OS X users running as root and disabling Gatekeeper.
Or the developers that stay away from the sandbox model.
One of the nice things of mobile OSes is that there isn't a way around the container model. Although the history with permissions kind of messes it.
http://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2008-5689/
I also know of only one FreeBSD Jail escape CVE in its entire existence.
https://www.freebsd.org/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-04:03...
These were years ago. Jails and zones are everywhere. You're kidding yourself if you think people haven't tried to attack them.
Solaris got hit by the one in 2012 which is the non-canonical RIP which hit a bunch of operating systems.
FreeBSD has had numerous kernel exploits which could be used for zone escapes.
edit: well i guess if your attacker knows you're on FreeBSD they could override to prison0 in the exploit. But it's a good thing we dont have a ton of local priv exploits, eh?
edit2: and that was a pretty ignorant statement of mine about root exploits anyway :)
The meaning of "Linux containers are not secure" is that untrusted code should not be given root privileges within a container. Google is generally not doing that. They have e.g. trusted Gmail code running on the same machine as trusted YouTube code, handling untrusted emails and untrusted videos. But the Gmail team is not worried about the YouTube team hacking them, or vice versa. The security mechanisms just need to keep honest people honest.
And when they do have untrusted, third-party code to run, for Google Cloud Platform, they use VMs or actual sandboxes: see section 6.1 of the paper you linked.
http://csl.stanford.edu/~christos/publications/2015.heracles...
Basically, if someone breaks into Gmail, you're already in deep trouble. You're not significantly better off because they didn't break into Hangouts. Same in the other direction. So you can run those on the same hardware.
If you think YouTube is less sensitive than Gmail (I don't know if Google actually does), you can separate those, sure. But there are enough applications that are no worse to break into than YouTube, like Photos. You can run those on the same hardware.
At Google's scale it's not too hard to say, this is the stuff we're ridiculously paranoid about and this is everything else, and get 80% CPU utilization on both infrastructures.
You mean Linux containers are not designed for this, nor are they designed to be secure. What a sad design failure.
Some [1] container technology was developed with security as a first principle.
[1]: http://us-east.manta.joyent.com/jmc/public/opensolaris/ARChi...