Defense in depth. With KVM, you'd have to exploit the guest kernel, then exploit KVM's hardware emulation to get to host userspace, then escalate to host root/kernel. (And KVM can use seccomp to limit itself, making that last step harder.) With Linux containers or Solaris Zones, you run directly on top of the host kernel, so you just need a single kernel exploit.
In any case, Zones and containers have the same security properties (running directly on top of the kernel), so the original comment about Zones being more secure than containers makes no sense.
Which is totally expected, because docker tries to be useful to the largest user-base possible. It would be quite harder to use if didn't support directory mounting (via -v). And it would be a total nightmare for almost every user if you had to specify a list of allowed syscalls for every container.
This reminds me the situation with SELinux a lot. It has improved a lot but I still see "disable SELinux" almost in every tutorial I read on CentOS, Fedora or RHEL.
Because security is hard.
Just look at the Mac OS X users running as root and disabling Gatekeeper.
Or the developers that stay away from the sandbox model.
One of the nice things of mobile OSes is that there isn't a way around the container model. Although the history with permissions kind of messes it.