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Re:The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little ... by kareemm on Thursday December 31, 2009 @05:19PM (#1025103)
while Israel's airport security method is second to none, it is not scalable, and therefore not applicable to the US (or many other countries), at least not without major restructuring.

The restructuring in the article didn't sound massive.

The Israeli methods focus on identifying terrorists by their behavior rather than their methods (box cutters, PETN, etc).

The biggest cost thus seems to be training staff to identify behavior, rather than spending millions on fancy technology that should identify methods but in reality don't work (http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2003744097...).

Make no mistake, airport security in Israel is no McJob, it is a prestigious, well-paid position, manned by the top classes of society.

source?

America is relying on cheap, unskilled labour for these jobs, and transitioning to an Israeli employment profile will bankrupt the system.

source?

---

In 2006, I flew El Al from LA to Toronto (which then went on to Tel Aviv). I've never felt safer on an airplane. The security wasn't theater and, FWIW, our flight left on time.

El Al security at LAX consisted of:

* the El Al check-in area being patrolled by soldiers (thanks to this, i'm told: http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/07/04/la.airport.shooting/),

* being questioned in line by the types of professional interviewers mentioned in the article,

* LAX (TSA) security, and

* El Al security at the gate (a metal detector and carry-on luggage was checked thoroughly)

I don't see why at least these precautions wouldn't be scalable.

There are 599 airports in the US that are certificated to serve commercial air carrier aircraft with nine or more seats (http://www.usatoday.com/travel/flights/2006-09-26-airport-nu...). 38 of those are international airports: http://www.pacificcoasttravelinfo.com/airports.asp).

The 2009 TSA budpest is $7 billion (http://www.afge.org/Index.cfm?Page=PressReleases&PressRe...).

Assuming $4B of that goes to airport security, that's $6.7M devoted to securing each airport. The power law dictates that most of those 599 will need a lot less, and a few will need a lot more. But the numbers don't seem crazily out of whack.

I don't believe any of us are airport security experts (would love to hear from one on this). But it's clear the current methods aren't working. If we are to improve, why not take cues from people who are doing better, run some experiments, and see what we can figure out?

It sure beats:

a) the current ridiculous security theater at US airports,

b) relying on passengers to fix flaws with current security by jumping would-be bombers mid-air, and then

c) dealing with the ensuing airport chaos as the TSA decides what regulations to implement to try and prevent the previous bombing attempt from happening again

[edit: fixed list spacing]

Re:The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little ... by ghshephard on Thursday December 31, 2009 @07:07PM (#1025240)
El Al Spends $100M securing 37 Aircraft. Scale that to the 8,225 Aircraft (http://www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_stat...) and you'd need a budget of $20 Billion+ without even taking into account that you have a heterogeneous population that doesn't lend itself to easy profiling (unlike israel).

The major vulnerability of the El Al security system is that anybody that isn't considered part of the "Risk Profile" (I.E. Muslim) - can walk right through the security system. The day a Jewish Terrorist decides to bomb El Al, is the end of the "Interview" system, and the adoption of shoe screening, liquid screening and full body scans.

To some degree it's easier just to selectively screen everyone and not even bother with the interview. Just pretend everyone fails it and eliminate that entire step.

And, I'll take exception to your statement "Current Methods Aren't working" - How many aircraft per day, or per month, heck _per year_ are being blown out of the American Aviation sky under the current regime?

Regarding security theater - Seems to be working for me.

"Relying on passengers to fix flaws" - Nobody is allowed to bring on guns, knives, or even large amounts of volatile liquids - the system is designed to allow passengers to subdue any hostiles on the plane. I think that's an excellent part of the current system.

"Airport Chaos" - I flew two days after the bombing incident out of YVR to SFO, before _anyone_ really knew what was about to happen next, after most of the restrictions had been put in place, but BEFORE Canada banned (most) Carry On Luggage for US bound flights. So, every single person was having their luggage checked AND being patted down - the net result of this "Chaos" - my normally 20 minute wait took 90 minutes.

But, the most important element to be aware of - the Israel Security systems works based on Racial Profiling - it's that simple. The United States has decided they don't want to go down that path, so, even if the El Al system would scale from 37 to 8,000+ Aircraft, it's not politically tenable.

Re:The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little ... by kareemm on Thursday December 31, 2009 @09:41PM (#1025385)
El Al Spends $100M securing 37 Aircraft

That assumes costs scale linearly with aircraft. Do they?

The major vulnerability of the El Al security system is that anybody that isn't considered part of the "Risk Profile" (I.E. Muslim) - can walk right through the security system.

I doubt this. Muslims are probably subject to higher scrutiny, but that doesn't preclude others from being subject to the same, Jews included.

How many aircraft per day, or per month, heck _per year_ are being blown out of the American Aviation sky under the current regime?

None. 2 attempts (shoe and underwear bomber). Both aborted not b/c of TSA methods, but because passengers took the initiative. If current methods were working, neither bomber would've been able to bring fire onto the plane.

Let me ask you - how many person-hours and dollars have been wasted due to unnecessary delays and tossed liquids.

"Relying on passengers to fix flaws" - Nobody is allowed to bring on guns, knives, or even large amounts of volatile liquids

If you want to bring on large amounts of volatile liquids, put them in a contact lens bottle. You're allowed to carry one on that's larger than 3oz (http://www.tsa.gov/travelers/airtravel/specialneeds/editoria...). Mine is a 16oz bottle, which I've brought on all the time. It has obviously always been contact lens solution, but it's never been verified other than by visually inspecting the label.

The system is designed to allow passengers to subdue any hostilities on the plane. I think that's an excellent part of the current system.

Nobody "designed" this. That's an artifact of how planes were used in 9/11. Prior to that, pax sat quietly in hopes that hijackers wouldn't blow up their plane. This is the last line of defense that works in spite of failures that allowed PETN and matches onto planes.

So, every single person was having their luggage checked AND being patted down - the net result of this "Chaos" - my normally 20 minute wait took 90 minutes.

I'd say a 450% increase in wait times is significant. But it sounds like you were one of the lucky ones: http://www.cbc.ca/canada/toronto/story/2009/12/27/tor-airpor...

Seems like giving every pax significant attention (pat downs or interviews) may actually be scalable. I'm happy to wait 90m to get on a flight and feel like it's safe.

But, the most important element to be aware of - the Israel Security systems works based on Racial Profiling - it's that simple. The United States has decided they don't want to go down that path, so, even if the El Al system would scale from 37 to 8,000+ Aircraft, it's not politically tenable.

Even if the racial profiling bit is true - and based on personal experience as well as anecdotes from non-muslim HN posters and friends I'm not sure it is - I'm less interested in what's politically tenable than what's best. Over time, politicians have a way of supporting the right course of action.

Re:The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little ... by kelnos on Saturday January 02, 2010 @09:02AM (#1027202)
> I'm happy to wait 90m to get on a flight and feel like it's safe.

Perhaps you are, but I don't think everyone is. I'm certainly not. I get the the airport 60 minutes before takeoff for a domestic flight, 90 minutes for international (when in another country; it's hard to tell how long it'll take to clear passport control). Traveling is difficult and stressful enough as it is; I prefer not to add to that with an unreasonable wait either standing in line or sitting in an uncomfortable chair.

I feel safe (enough) as-is. I'd feel just as safe if the liquid restrictions and requirements to take off shoes and remove laptops from bags were eliminated from the screening process.

I'm well aware that I'm more likely to die every time I get behind the wheel of my car, than in airplane-related terrorism. Doesn't stop me from driving, though.

And that's really the thing. People absolutely suck at risk assessment.

Re:The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little ... by houseabsolute on Friday January 01, 2010 @08:18PM (#1026538)
> If current methods were working, neither bomber would've been able to bring fire onto the plane.

What you just said was that in order to meet your standard of working, a security system must produce no false negatives at all. I'm sure you didn't mean that because it's a totally ridiculous position to hold, but I just wanted to point it out in case anyone else took you at your words.

> I'd say a 450% increase in wait times is significant.

Indeed. When I read the grandparent I was unsure whether he was being sarcastic when talking about the jump in wait time. I just flew home from Hong Kong today and the additional screening process probably took an hour or so of full-time effort from ten or fifteen security people. It's hard for me to believe that this system can remain in place permanently.

Re:The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little ... by jacquesm on Friday January 01, 2010 @12:32PM (#1025942)
> The day a Jewish Terrorist decides to bomb El Al, is the end of the "Interview" system, and the adoption of shoe screening, liquid screening and full body scans.

I always figured white old ladies would make for the best terrorists.

Re:The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little ... by endtime on Friday January 01, 2010 @11:02AM (#1025835)
>The day a Jewish Terrorist decides to bomb El Al, is the end of the "Interview" system, and the adoption of shoe screening, liquid screening and full body scans.

First of all, that's not a very realistic concern, which is why they're not concerned by it. Second of all, I don't think you understand how the interview system works. It's based on evaluating behavior and trying to detect anxiety - they don't just ask whether your name is Yossi or Abdullah.

Re:The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little ... by kelnos on Saturday January 02, 2010 @08:51AM (#1027192)
> the net result of this "Chaos" - my normally 20 minute wait took 90 minutes.

And you think that's acceptable? I don't.

Re:The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little ... by intellectronica on Thursday December 31, 2009 @05:35PM (#1025117)
My source for Israel is my impressions as someone who grew up in Israel, flew through Tel-Aviv many times (last time this morning) and had quite a few friends who worked in airport security. I think it's quite reliable.

My source of the TSA is just my impressions from travelling from the US, so it's probably not that reliable.

Re:The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little ... by dalke on Thursday December 31, 2009 @07:11PM (#1025243)
"I don't see why at least these precautions wouldn't be scalable"

I believe those policies were in place at Amsterdam airport already for US flights. At least, I have memories of being asked behavioral questions at the gate and of another screening of my carry-on luggage and walking through the metal detector. I can't say anything about the process in place last week.

If it was in place, and still didn't work, then what?

Re:The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little ... by jacquesm on Friday January 01, 2010 @12:09PM (#1025920)
The problem is not that it wasn't in place and didn't work, it probably works 99.9% of the time. So all you need to do is throw enough people at that crack to become successful.

Airport security is after the fact, you need to work to create a world in which would-be-suicide bombers have too much to lose, and are too smart to be brain washed.

In the end that's probably cheaper too.

Re:The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little ... by waterlesscloud on Friday January 01, 2010 @12:45PM (#1025960)
A world in which would be bombers instead come from wealthy families and are smart enough to be engineering students,

You know, like the last would be bomber.

Can we put to rest the myth that it's lack of opportunity and education that creates terrorists? It's blatantly not true.

Re:The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little ... by jacquesm on Friday January 01, 2010 @01:16PM (#1025999)
It has nothing to do with lack of opportunity or education, that was not my point.

It's exactly that which blinds people to see that there are plenty of other reasons outside of material possessions and education that drives them to become radicalized, that is the root cause of all this.

Dissatisfaction has many roots, not just those that one kind of society values.

Re:The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little ... by delackner on Saturday January 02, 2010 @10:15PM (#1028128)
Though I suspect you are trolling, I bite. Do you really think there would be terrorists in this world if everyone had enough food to eat, medical care, and lived in a free society?
Re:The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little ... by ebrenes on Monday January 04, 2010 @11:41AM (#1030581)
In my own opinion, I do really think there would still be terrorists in this world, even if everyone had enough food to eat, medical care and lived in a free society.

A significant part of terrorism is based on an imbalance of power, where one group exploits another or merely when one group feels significantly slighted or oppressed by another group.

That is why, I believe, that these educated people become radicals after their western education. They see a huge power imbalance that marginalizes them and their culture. They see a culture and history that conspires against their way of life, where the entrenched powers exploit every possible avenue to stay on top, some times at the cost of other players

Theses terrorists strike out not because they lack for food, medical care or freedom, but because they identify with a group that has been oppressed or subjected to the whims of another power to which they don't identify or resent. It is especially effective if that other power conceptually conspires against their preferred way of life.

In other words, your measures would merely raise the standard of living, but would not eradicate the power differences that give rise to the fundamental fuel of terrorism. I would agree that it would reduce the incidence of terrorism overall, as it would become harder to find martyrs, but it would not eradicate the phenomena.

Re:The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little ... by delackner on Friday January 08, 2010 @01:50AM (#1039046)
In your response you say that people who are well educated often sympathize with people who are oppressed or powerless. Who are they going to sympathize with in a society where everyone is protected and living free? The horrible plight of people with boring jobs? The evils of waiting in line for free medical care? The injustice of not having enough french cheese to go around?
Re:The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little ... by StrawberryFrog on Friday January 01, 2010 @03:34PM (#1026191)
it probably works 99.9% of the time. So all you need to do is throw enough people at that crack to become successful.

That approach doesn't scale. Imaging the organisation needed for sending 1000 suicide bombers. Now imagine keeping it functioning, and avoiding consequences catching up with it as it sends in the first ten or so.

Re:The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little ... by jacquesm on Friday January 01, 2010 @05:34PM (#1026367)
Not for one thing or another, but the 99.9% I quoted is probably a little high. Even after 9/11 there have been at least two that we are all aware made it past security, we're not hearing about those that didn't unless there is no way around it.

So you probably don't need thousands, you probably need on the order of several 10's or so to get through once.

Keep in mind that there is a reservoir of 1000's if not 10's of thousands of people that would gladly give their lives to do damage to others.

They didn't pick a guy from Africa for nothing and a guy from England last time, those are much easier to escape profiling (the first time). I wouldn't be surprised if the next one would be asian, assuming they have such a person in their ranks.

No filter that has to pass the number of passengers that we're looking at here will ever be perfect, and if you study the filter long enough you're going to find holes.

And suppose the filter is perfect, then move on to other, softer targets until through lack of activity the filter loses its effectiveness.

Basically any place where lots of people gather (lots is something larger than 50 or so) is a target for a potential attack.

Re:The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little ... by StrawberryFrog on Saturday January 02, 2010 @06:15PM (#1027828)
So you probably don't need thousands, you probably need on the order of several 10's or so to get through once.

And the underbomber's gang will get, supposing that they can try repeatedly - what? - Three goes tops before the hammer comes down on them.