From what I understand, the criminal/terrorist probably would draw suspicion even if approached by relatively untrained airport staff "greeter", and draw further attention to themselves.

Remember that the Abdulmutallab came from Yemen, Paid Cash, and had a one-way ticket. Those factors alone, should have warranted further attention during screening, that others would not have recieved because of a benign profile.

The problem here could be that -- at least in the US -- a lot of military personnel come out of the military with some sort of chip on their shoulder towards the rest of society. Though I could just be exaggerating the issue.

If the new security personnel act like 'bullies with a badge' rather than trained professionals, it still might leave air travel as an unpleasant experience.

However, from what I was aware the FBI, CIA and several federal agencies in the US tend to get 'first pick' when it came to the ex-military talent. So I wouldn't know if this pool of soldiers is already being tapped to the max.

The key is that the job allows employees to be assigned to a station out of the country after a year or so of working TLV. This attracts young people who want to study abroad - it's not uncommon that your El Al screener in JFK would be a grad student at NYU, for example. It also keeps them more motivated, since they see view it as a temporary job rather than a dead end McJob.

Of course, in Israel those young students also happen to have 2-3 years' military service behind them, but this isn't that big a deal. It's almost irrelevant for their job (unlike El Al's sky marshals, though, which are another key element)

Another factor is the prestige that comes with passing the tight selection process and working in the security sector, which is considered possibly the most important aspect of the modern incarnation of Zionism, the national ideological school in Israel. Working in airport security is good on your resume, it will impress your friends and family, it will allow you to think good thing about yourself. I'm almost certain that's not the case for working for the TSA.

Having a few years as a screener on your resume doesn't hurt, but more because it means you've passed a pretty difficult filtering process and worked a few years in a high-standard and high stress environment than due to any ideology. If the TSA had similar standards, its alumni would probably have similar reputation.

1. Scale

Scale is an issue, but nobody in the thread has touched on why. The Israeli security model is (as noted in the article) more about the passenger than their baggage. This approach is both effective, time-consuming, and "racist": the profilers have a conversation with each passenger; as I'm an Israeli Jew, I always get the abbreviated treatment -- focusing more on where my bags have been since I've packed them. As a foreigner, you get a much more in-depth grilling. As a Muslim? They want to know your shoe size, and then a whole 'nother screener comes over and asks you everything all over again, just to see that you keep your story straight. Like they say in the article, the conversations they have are not so much about what you say as how you say it. The screeners are taught to iterate a few levels deep into your story and see that it doesn't break down under scrutiny.

Naturally, this process supposes that A) the threat is foreign and mostly limited to one ethnic/religious group, and B) screeners have this sort of time.

In the US, racial profiling is... unpalatable, and if each passenger / family got even a perfunctory 1-minute Q&A session with a TSA security officer, the system would crash. The US is dealing with a larger threat profile, and a whole different order-of-magnitude of traffic.

2. The security screener's job: manpower, training, history

Normally these are intelligent men and women, usually students or twentysomethings, who pass a series of exams and then pass a several-month course. The hours are craptastic but the pay is decent, and a lot of students prefer it to shiftwork or waitressing. Passing the course is difficult but not arduous, and in the end you are really being taught guidelines on interrogation and then set loose to use your judgment -- if you have a red flag to raise, then you just call over a senior screener who has more years of experience.

The reality is that there are few enough openings that the program can be selective. I'd say, as a generalization, screeners here possess above-average intelligence, whereas your average TSA screener seems to be a working stiff, blindly following some not-too-complex screening algorithm in a three-ring binder. The number of screeners requisite for staffing all of the US airports precludes the TSA from exclusively employing screeners with the ability to make "judgment calls". There just aren't enough smart people with the desire to work a screener's job in the US.

Also of note: screeners here can be idiot asses just like anywhere. I've heard stories from many business colleagues who traveled to Israel on business in the last decade. During the rougher periods of disquiet, they suffered from overzealous screeners who couldn't believe that despite "the situation," there were some businesspeople who had to come here with equipment to demonstrate. Just like the TSA, if a screener decides to make your life unpleasant, it is unpleasant, and there's nothing you can do about it.

Past "experience" in the army is completely meaningless for this job. Despite myths about the Israeli army, we are not all super-mossad-spies with extensive training in terrorism and interrogation techniques. Even combat soldiers aren't taught how to perform interrogations; they're taught tactics of battle. The generally security-oriented mindset is fostered at a much younger age with PSA's about unattended bags aimed at schoolchildren.

In the end, the system here relies on quality manpower, trained to employ their judgment of whether or not a given person constitutes a risk. In the US, "subjective" is merely a synonym for "pending lawsuit".

Amusingly, I don't think the system here would be as compromised by a "procedure document" leak like the recently-infamous TSA docs. Like any good security, it works just as well if you know how it works than if you don't.

The Israeli security ring is built around human credibility, while the US focuses on the physical aspect of security.

From the article:

"the security set-up at Israel's largest hub, Tel Aviv's Ben Gurion Airport, has not been breached since 2002, when a passenger mistakenly carried a handgun onto a flight."

The handgun would have been detected on a US flight because screening would be done more thoroughly. The person forgot about the handgun, and thus came out completely credible to Israeli security. This is just like undergoing a polygraph.

And if you think about it, it makes sense in a way. This particular person wouldn't use the handgun, so why bother screening it?

What a quote, Chapeaux!

I think this would change quickly if you advertise effectively and increase the pay.

great comments btw, both your's and parent's (I have to post this b/c my upvotes aren't being counted).

Ben Gurion airport isn't even listed. The US, Asian, and European airports handling this traffic could not possibly scale to handle this Israeli solution.

That said, it may (or may not) be beneficial to find components of the Israeli solution that would work best to handle the issues with manpower and volume.

It would seem absurd on its face.

But, it does scale. Not elegantly. But it does. We're capable of amazing things when there's political will.

And I'll tell you this, I fly far more than the average American. And so I chat a lot with other pax. I feel strongly that a headline reading "Airport Security Focus Shifts from baggage to passenger: _Keep your shoes on and answer a few questions_" would be very well received in this country.

Israel is a very small amount of land, a relatively small population compared to us, and most of the people are relatively highly trained due to mandatory conscription.

1. Manpower is an issue which could be readily addressed by increasing the pay and training of the job. Lets say that manpower is a concern. Well here is a novel idea: don't screen everyone. Screen every 5th, every 4th, etc. Mix up your screening. This alone will send the message that we are gearing up towards using this method.

2. Volume is a red herring. Just replicate what works at one airport by the number of airports we have. Yes it will cost and yes it will be hard to staff but just pay more and increase training. What is the alternative? Bottom line is that we can not afford larger holes in the confidence the flying public has in air travel. Not including the actual cost of losing a plane.

To all of those that talk of "profiling" I will ask you to research the Hindawi affair, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hindawi_Affair. The bottom line is that profiling is used heavily but nobody gets a free pass. Nobody. I've been flying ElAl for a long time and I always get a through questioning. Fact is is that it doesn't take long for them to establish I am not a threat.

Why can't we? We survived it before. And I have some bad news for you: it's almost certain we'll have to survive it again some time in the next fifteen to twenty years, if not sooner. Our luck with the missed bombs will not hold out forever. It will be a tragedy. Life will continue (except for those people for whom it does not).

The restructuring in the article didn't sound massive.

The Israeli methods focus on identifying terrorists by their behavior rather than their methods (box cutters, PETN, etc).

The biggest cost thus seems to be training staff to identify behavior, rather than spending millions on fancy technology that should identify methods but in reality don't work (http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2003744097...).

Make no mistake, airport security in Israel is no McJob, it is a prestigious, well-paid position, manned by the top classes of society.

source?

America is relying on cheap, unskilled labour for these jobs, and transitioning to an Israeli employment profile will bankrupt the system.

source?

---

In 2006, I flew El Al from LA to Toronto (which then went on to Tel Aviv). I've never felt safer on an airplane. The security wasn't theater and, FWIW, our flight left on time.

El Al security at LAX consisted of:

* the El Al check-in area being patrolled by soldiers (thanks to this, i'm told: http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/07/04/la.airport.shooting/),

* being questioned in line by the types of professional interviewers mentioned in the article,

* LAX (TSA) security, and

* El Al security at the gate (a metal detector and carry-on luggage was checked thoroughly)

I don't see why at least these precautions wouldn't be scalable.

There are 599 airports in the US that are certificated to serve commercial air carrier aircraft with nine or more seats (http://www.usatoday.com/travel/flights/2006-09-26-airport-nu...). 38 of those are international airports: http://www.pacificcoasttravelinfo.com/airports.asp).

The 2009 TSA budpest is $7 billion (http://www.afge.org/Index.cfm?Page=PressReleases&PressRe...).

Assuming $4B of that goes to airport security, that's $6.7M devoted to securing each airport. The power law dictates that most of those 599 will need a lot less, and a few will need a lot more. But the numbers don't seem crazily out of whack.

I don't believe any of us are airport security experts (would love to hear from one on this). But it's clear the current methods aren't working. If we are to improve, why not take cues from people who are doing better, run some experiments, and see what we can figure out?

It sure beats:

a) the current ridiculous security theater at US airports,

b) relying on passengers to fix flaws with current security by jumping would-be bombers mid-air, and then

c) dealing with the ensuing airport chaos as the TSA decides what regulations to implement to try and prevent the previous bombing attempt from happening again

[edit: fixed list spacing]

The major vulnerability of the El Al security system is that anybody that isn't considered part of the "Risk Profile" (I.E. Muslim) - can walk right through the security system. The day a Jewish Terrorist decides to bomb El Al, is the end of the "Interview" system, and the adoption of shoe screening, liquid screening and full body scans.

To some degree it's easier just to selectively screen everyone and not even bother with the interview. Just pretend everyone fails it and eliminate that entire step.

And, I'll take exception to your statement "Current Methods Aren't working" - How many aircraft per day, or per month, heck _per year_ are being blown out of the American Aviation sky under the current regime?

Regarding security theater - Seems to be working for me.

"Relying on passengers to fix flaws" - Nobody is allowed to bring on guns, knives, or even large amounts of volatile liquids - the system is designed to allow passengers to subdue any hostiles on the plane. I think that's an excellent part of the current system.

"Airport Chaos" - I flew two days after the bombing incident out of YVR to SFO, before _anyone_ really knew what was about to happen next, after most of the restrictions had been put in place, but BEFORE Canada banned (most) Carry On Luggage for US bound flights. So, every single person was having their luggage checked AND being patted down - the net result of this "Chaos" - my normally 20 minute wait took 90 minutes.

But, the most important element to be aware of - the Israel Security systems works based on Racial Profiling - it's that simple. The United States has decided they don't want to go down that path, so, even if the El Al system would scale from 37 to 8,000+ Aircraft, it's not politically tenable.

That assumes costs scale linearly with aircraft. Do they?

The major vulnerability of the El Al security system is that anybody that isn't considered part of the "Risk Profile" (I.E. Muslim) - can walk right through the security system.

I doubt this. Muslims are probably subject to higher scrutiny, but that doesn't preclude others from being subject to the same, Jews included.

How many aircraft per day, or per month, heck _per year_ are being blown out of the American Aviation sky under the current regime?

None. 2 attempts (shoe and underwear bomber). Both aborted not b/c of TSA methods, but because passengers took the initiative. If current methods were working, neither bomber would've been able to bring fire onto the plane.

Let me ask you - how many person-hours and dollars have been wasted due to unnecessary delays and tossed liquids.

"Relying on passengers to fix flaws" - Nobody is allowed to bring on guns, knives, or even large amounts of volatile liquids

If you want to bring on large amounts of volatile liquids, put them in a contact lens bottle. You're allowed to carry one on that's larger than 3oz (http://www.tsa.gov/travelers/airtravel/specialneeds/editoria...). Mine is a 16oz bottle, which I've brought on all the time. It has obviously always been contact lens solution, but it's never been verified other than by visually inspecting the label.

The system is designed to allow passengers to subdue any hostilities on the plane. I think that's an excellent part of the current system.

Nobody "designed" this. That's an artifact of how planes were used in 9/11. Prior to that, pax sat quietly in hopes that hijackers wouldn't blow up their plane. This is the last line of defense that works in spite of failures that allowed PETN and matches onto planes.

So, every single person was having their luggage checked AND being patted down - the net result of this "Chaos" - my normally 20 minute wait took 90 minutes.

I'd say a 450% increase in wait times is significant. But it sounds like you were one of the lucky ones: http://www.cbc.ca/canada/toronto/story/2009/12/27/tor-airpor...

Seems like giving every pax significant attention (pat downs or interviews) may actually be scalable. I'm happy to wait 90m to get on a flight and feel like it's safe.

But, the most important element to be aware of - the Israel Security systems works based on Racial Profiling - it's that simple. The United States has decided they don't want to go down that path, so, even if the El Al system would scale from 37 to 8,000+ Aircraft, it's not politically tenable.

Even if the racial profiling bit is true - and based on personal experience as well as anecdotes from non-muslim HN posters and friends I'm not sure it is - I'm less interested in what's politically tenable than what's best. Over time, politicians have a way of supporting the right course of action.

Perhaps you are, but I don't think everyone is. I'm certainly not. I get the the airport 60 minutes before takeoff for a domestic flight, 90 minutes for international (when in another country; it's hard to tell how long it'll take to clear passport control). Traveling is difficult and stressful enough as it is; I prefer not to add to that with an unreasonable wait either standing in line or sitting in an uncomfortable chair.

I feel safe (enough) as-is. I'd feel just as safe if the liquid restrictions and requirements to take off shoes and remove laptops from bags were eliminated from the screening process.

I'm well aware that I'm more likely to die every time I get behind the wheel of my car, than in airplane-related terrorism. Doesn't stop me from driving, though.

And that's really the thing. People absolutely suck at risk assessment.

What you just said was that in order to meet your standard of working, a security system must produce no false negatives at all. I'm sure you didn't mean that because it's a totally ridiculous position to hold, but I just wanted to point it out in case anyone else took you at your words.

> I'd say a 450% increase in wait times is significant.

Indeed. When I read the grandparent I was unsure whether he was being sarcastic when talking about the jump in wait time. I just flew home from Hong Kong today and the additional screening process probably took an hour or so of full-time effort from ten or fifteen security people. It's hard for me to believe that this system can remain in place permanently.

I always figured white old ladies would make for the best terrorists.

First of all, that's not a very realistic concern, which is why they're not concerned by it. Second of all, I don't think you understand how the interview system works. It's based on evaluating behavior and trying to detect anxiety - they don't just ask whether your name is Yossi or Abdullah.

And you think that's acceptable? I don't.

My source of the TSA is just my impressions from travelling from the US, so it's probably not that reliable.

I believe those policies were in place at Amsterdam airport already for US flights. At least, I have memories of being asked behavioral questions at the gate and of another screening of my carry-on luggage and walking through the metal detector. I can't say anything about the process in place last week.

If it was in place, and still didn't work, then what?

Airport security is after the fact, you need to work to create a world in which would-be-suicide bombers have too much to lose, and are too smart to be brain washed.

In the end that's probably cheaper too.

You know, like the last would be bomber.

Can we put to rest the myth that it's lack of opportunity and education that creates terrorists? It's blatantly not true.

It's exactly that which blinds people to see that there are plenty of other reasons outside of material possessions and education that drives them to become radicalized, that is the root cause of all this.

Dissatisfaction has many roots, not just those that one kind of society values.

A significant part of terrorism is based on an imbalance of power, where one group exploits another or merely when one group feels significantly slighted or oppressed by another group.

That is why, I believe, that these educated people become radicals after their western education. They see a huge power imbalance that marginalizes them and their culture. They see a culture and history that conspires against their way of life, where the entrenched powers exploit every possible avenue to stay on top, some times at the cost of other players

Theses terrorists strike out not because they lack for food, medical care or freedom, but because they identify with a group that has been oppressed or subjected to the whims of another power to which they don't identify or resent. It is especially effective if that other power conceptually conspires against their preferred way of life.

In other words, your measures would merely raise the standard of living, but would not eradicate the power differences that give rise to the fundamental fuel of terrorism. I would agree that it would reduce the incidence of terrorism overall, as it would become harder to find martyrs, but it would not eradicate the phenomena.

That approach doesn't scale. Imaging the organisation needed for sending 1000 suicide bombers. Now imagine keeping it functioning, and avoiding consequences catching up with it as it sends in the first ten or so.

So you probably don't need thousands, you probably need on the order of several 10's or so to get through once.

Keep in mind that there is a reservoir of 1000's if not 10's of thousands of people that would gladly give their lives to do damage to others.

They didn't pick a guy from Africa for nothing and a guy from England last time, those are much easier to escape profiling (the first time). I wouldn't be surprised if the next one would be asian, assuming they have such a person in their ranks.

No filter that has to pass the number of passengers that we're looking at here will ever be perfect, and if you study the filter long enough you're going to find holes.

And suppose the filter is perfect, then move on to other, softer targets until through lack of activity the filter loses its effectiveness.

Basically any place where lots of people gather (lots is something larger than 50 or so) is a target for a potential attack.

And the underbomber's gang will get, supposing that they can try repeatedly - what? - Three goes tops before the hammer comes down on them.

2 isn't clearly an issue; you need to consider something more like the ratio of airport / population.

TSA's current model is expensive for the airlines because it is deterring people from flying.

It's expensive for airline travelers because it's adding significantly to the hassle of flying: I believe that many flyers would pay more for the Israeli model if it was at least equally effective because it saves time. I believe that they would pay even more if it was not only less hassle but more effective than the current "security theatre" approach.