> While it seems pretty obvious that Apple could in theory substitute keys and thus enable eavesdropping, in practice it may require substantial changes to Apple's code.
> Any way you slice it, it's a risky operation.
This is really really poor. A government is not going to give anything about that it might be risky. That's for Apply to handle. Further, the author of the article pretends that the key server is a black box that's not entirely understood and therefore it is safe because it won't be changed. Strange assumptions based upon guesses.
There's various ways to make it possible to comply with a government request. Just send a modified version of the software to the device, change the keyserver, etc. Anyway, the government is not going to care much about how you do it.
As a company you get some leeway with following rules but eventually there will be a fine big enough to make you comply. That's just what I noticed from customs across various countries.
The much more interesting question: how many ways are there to make sure, in advance, that you are unable to do so?
I am not sure about this type of security argument generally. It says, with all the guns out there who cares about knives? Well, maybe lots of people still care about them. And they still hurt when you find yourself on the wrong end of one.
>> It's like speculating about the owners of an Internet café implementing a TLS MITM attack in their own network's router
This is also just another speculation. We can't know because it's closed source.
BUT what closed source project doesn't have Root?
Sure you can have encryption on client side BUT once again they have root to the encryption even.
So not really speculation as much as philosophy
> Apple controls iPhones. They have root access, you don't. It's the future that Richard Stallman predicted in The Right To Read, except he thought it would be Microsoft. In this kind of situation, why would you even mention key substitution attacks? It's like speculating about the owners of an Internet café implementing a TLS MITM attack in their own network's router in order to spy on HTTPS connections originating from their own machines. Why bother when you're root?