If really the problem was relatively trivial, VW should have warned me on how to avoid it, and they didn't. It can't be a simple amplifier: it's not just proximity, you actually have to press a button on the dongle to open a door, so whatever they were doing, it wasn't just repeating an existing signal; and as I said, I can tell you that making sure the car is locked has become a nightly ritual.
I can imagine a design where the RF signal is being generated on a very low voltage/low power device that's always/permanently on, and pressing the button enables an integrated antenna that suddenly boosts the signal to a usable signal strength.
In that case, the attacker just has to simulate a increase in signal strength if they are already tapping your signal.
Electronic design doesn't follow the same rules as physical device designs - for example, that power button on your PC, it doesn't really close any circuit! It just tells the motherboard that it's ok to let voltage through a certain electrical pathway, the computer is already permanently on and is trickling power from AC / Mains.
You can use software to tell the motherboard to activate the same way that "pressing the button" does - ie remote server control over pxe, etc.
Most cars are always on trickling power from their battery waiting to hear that signal, I wouldn't be surprised if dongle design follow the same principle.
Whether my locks open with an easily-spoofable RF signal or with a bruteforceable key, the bottom line is still that they are not doing good crypto in situations where it's clearly necessary.
I won't be surprised if there's another, even more serious vulnerability in Volkswagen locks. The security researcher who found it probably sold it to the bad guys, totally understandable after reading how Volkswagen handles security reports.
Neither of those things is VW's fault - if you don't like the wireless automatic door unlocking because the signal can be boosted maliciously, then you should disable it. Otherwise live with the consequences.