simmervigor
Go and enhance your calm: demolishing an HTTP/2 interop problem
Defending QUIC from acknowledgement-based DDoS attacks
Thanks for the detailed information. I'm a someone from Cloudflare responsible for this, we'll get it looked at.
From a qlog and MASQUE enthusiast
Technical Advisory – Hash DoS Attack in Multiple QUIC Implementations
Taking (Back?) My Internet Privacy and Presence
> The IETF Datatracker is the day-to-day front-end to the IETF database for people who work on IETF standards. It contains data about the documents, working groups, meetings, agendas, minutes, presentations, and more, of the IETF.
This is the main way that folks interact with and do their work in the IETF. The other being discussion on mailing lists.
One might argue datatracker isn't a great name, but naming things is hard.
TL;DR just like HTTP/2, we wanted to avoid friction in deploying these protocols. Having to rewrite URLs because of new schemes is pretty unpalatable, it has major impact. Instead, HTTP/3 can rely on other IETF-defined mechanisms like Alt-Svc (RFC 7838) and the more recent SVCB / HTTPS RR [1] DNS-based methods. The latter has been deployed on Cloudflare a while [2] and supported in Firefox. Other user agents have also expressed interest or intent to support it.
The net outcome is that developers can by and large focus on HTTP semantics, and let something a little further down the stack worry more about versions. Sometime devs will need to peek into that area, but not the majority.
[1] - https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-... [2] - https://blog.cloudflare.com/speeding-up-https-and-http-3-neg...
Considerations are just that. Choices in light of considerations can be traded off by client implementations - they can make their own choices about how to address these matters.
The work in the IETF to define oblivious DNS and oblivious HTTP [2] protocols is a step towards reducing such surfaces, at the trade off of functionality.
[1] https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9113.html#section-10.8 [2] https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/ohai/about/
Some of those are more optional than others i.e. Server Push. Whether implementations choose to support a feature or not, at least the IETF maintain the close parity at the protocol level.
Stream prioritization is a different matter. That was very tricky in HTTP/3 [1], and through the process we designed Extensible Priorities, which is simpler and works over both H2 and H3. That was published today also as RFC 9218[2].
[1] https://blog.cloudflare.com/adopting-a-new-approach-to-http-...
[2] https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9218
Edit: typo fix
This is what the IETF has been doing for several years already as part of the core HTTP specification rewrite. Namely, see the HTTP Semantics document https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-semantics...
Semantics are common, how those map to specific transport - how it looks on the wire - is then the job of each individual HTTP version.
It reads like you're overlooking the act of standardization in improving the definition of a protocol. Experimentation is good but often only focuses on a limited set of use cases, deployments, or implementations. Standardization is great for interoperability across a more diverse set of all those three. This typically yields protocols that are more generally applicable for a wider population of the Internet.
Google QUIC was focused on an HTTP use case and thatbran through the entire design. Through the IETF process, the design evolved to be a far more generic transport with rich extensibility and modularity.
https://twitter.com/alagoutte/status/1532013841718120449?t=W...
Intermediaries can have different purposes. The official alternative to reverse proxy is "gateway", which is unfortunately overloaded with other kinds of gateways in networking.
Naming things is hard. Reverse proxy isn't great but all things considered is unique enough to allow folks to discriminate the sort of HTTP proxying that is happening
The proxy could inspect the traffic it is carrying and try to enforce some access control or policy. However, the use of TLS or other encrypted protocols limits the ability to do see what is happening. Then you get into a different logical layer of whether there is MITM happening, but that is tangential to conventional use case for HTTP proxy.