mgii

Notice that as it seems, the vast majority are caught and deleted due to the intense automation, not the detection of malicious contents. If the actor was to run a smoother automation process, probably nothing would have been deleted. (disclaimer: author this article)

To be fair, the kind of programmer who would include an infected repo is almost everyone. Many infected repos have no indicators except for username to help you notice without a careful examination, especially in niche repos. When you have to move fast, it's natural to make such mistakes.

I can approve this from our findings (author of this research): our system lists around 100 instances of the pattern you've mentioned every week, and around %3 are malicious. It would be great seeing it coming to an end.

This is more likely than one would think, given such a large amount of samples as detected in this campaign. But there are at least 2 main barriers of an actual incident:

1. Internal instructions telling the generator to avoid exactly that. We wouldn't want to rely on this alone though.

2. Due to LLMs nature, it's unlikely that such generated malicious code would repeat addresses of actual malicious actors. This still leaves a variety of attack vectors such as bind shell, dos, on-site exfiltration, and more.

There seems to be a lot of confusion between malware and vulnerabilities. None of the vendors mentioned in this subthread detects malicious code, only vulnerabilities.

Good as they'll be in detecting vulnerabilities, you are still unprotected from malicious code planted in your code bases.