jwieczorek
I know it's likely just a typo, but anyway: it is heavily concentrated in the east.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/08/sputnik-russia-corona...
English is a language many young Slavs learn in preparation to or in the course of their professional life as in the world of the Pax Americana it quite simply has become an economical necessity to know it well. However, the English language cannot naturally transmit any of the linguistic particularities (proverbs, turns of phrases) and, generally, cultural notions and historical familiarities that to a certain extent are shared by the various Slavic peoples. English for Slavs is a foreign language in the true sense of the word, whereas a language like Russian is much closer linguistically and culturally. There's the heritage of the Soviet Union which makes Russian the trans-national language of choice for the generations educated in the Soviet times. And indeed that could be the very same reason why these days it's rather unpopular among the young people in, say, Poland. Which is a real shame because as a trans-Slavic language IMO it does a great job and is a very beautiful language as well.
I am Polish and when speaking to a fellow Slav, I much prefer to try to get us to speak in our own languages, even if it requires effort. Otherwise, I prefer to speak Russian if the person I'm communicating with knows it too. I find it very, very awkward using English in those situations, i.e. in conversations with a Serb or a Czech (but not with a German or a Swede).
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/06/system-circumvent-san...
When it comes to the reasons behind sanctions, there's no need to correct me, because I wrote just that: that the international reactions were a response to, in the words of the sanctioning countries, international law being violated (as if that had not happened before, see the Kosovo case), and namely the principle of territorial integrity. All I'm saying is that sanctions targetting the people who expressed their will in the referendum are counter-productive. If there were people left in Crimea, who still haven't made their mind up whose umbrella Crimea would be best off under (though comparing the mayhem state Crimea was left in after the Ukrainian rule and the investments going on there since 2014 – I doubt there are many), then acts like this will surely make them anti-American, not anti-Kremlin. This was my point.
The legality of the Crimean referendum might be an interesting question for lawyers or political scientists (especially the double standards observed in the rhetoric of the US and its satellite states). Or for us, not living there. For the people who voted in the referendum and have seen their lives improve as a result of their vote – it just doesn't matter. And that's the reality some should accept, while rejecting it leads to sloppy analysis of issues like the one discussed in this very post.
In general, this thread demonstrates that here there's very little understanding about the mass psychology of Russians, and, really, any nation other than Americans. No one in Crimea is going to rebel against the Russian government because of the U.S. sanctions against them exclusively. A policy like this only validates the Russian government's narrative of the U.S. going after Russia as such. If the U.S. government wanted to seek allies in Crimeans, they could perhaps focus on sanctioning Moscovian oligarchs. Well, except they won't, because Russian oligarchs that lose leverage in the Kremlin later make for good dissidents to be used by the U.S. as an ideological tool against Russia. And the oligarchic system is keeping Russia from modernizing, which is also in the U.S. interest.
You're making it sound as if people were suffering and running away from there. Well, sorry to disappoint you, but the net migration is positive and rising.
Companies like Siemens are doing business there. For now, they have to pretend that they don't even know about it, but that is going to change too as the U.S. continue to lose their hegemony in Europe.
It's called political realism, so you look at the reality, do an analysis and try to draw conclusions based on a calculation of chances of success/failure and potential benefits and losses compared with the status quo. You look at how strong you are, and how strong is your opponent. You look at how much you have now and how much you could possibly gain. You look at who else could benefit from your action, and whether those foreign parties are not provoking you to take a certain course of action in their interest, not yours (the classical question cui bono?). Sadly, the ones who were bothered to do any of this, were being marginalized, and in today's pop historical discourse (fortunately, not the scientific one) are often referred to as predators or collaborators. And Fins were smarter than that.
When it comes to Poland regaining independence in 1918, the role of "us" is often blatantly overestimated in the Polish historical mythology. First of all, there wasn't really an us. There was a land-owning class and there were peasants, with often conflicting interests. The land-owning class would do just fine without an independent state (well, it became a concern for them after the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, for obvious reasons), and the peasants were bothered not so much about independence but who would give them right to land, and who would not. Their varying role in the 1920 war gives us a good idea about this. Second, while the role of the very blurred us is overestimated, what gets neglected is the role of foreign powers, who were drawing the maps of the post-war Europe. And here, I'm afraid, they couldn't care less about how many hazardous insurrections the Poles pulled off in the 19th century. All that mattered was that the Western Europe needed a cordon sanitaire between them and the Soviet Russia that'd protect the interests of the capitalistic model from a foreign intervention (this was way before the Bolsheviks settled on building socialism in their own country). Plus, the Anglo-Saxons needed a political arm in Central Europe, which would serve as an instrument in their policy of keeping Germany and Russia conflicted or at a distance, in the spirit of their perennial divide and conquer strategy towards continental Europe. And even the Polish representatives, whose signatures can be found under the Treaty of Versailles, were indeed the realists (national democrats), not the romantic insurrectionists.
I don't know too much about Kurds and their political situation, so I won't be making opinionated statements.
No, it's not.
That's not the history, as you just admitted yourself: he abolished serfdom and started a period of unprecedented prosperity in Polish history (when the Polish city Łódź had gone from a village to become one of the main industrial centers in the whole of Europe), among many other things. The list could go on but the point is this: you pick statements that suit your feelings and therefore are not even close to serve as an objective description of a historical figure.
I would even argue, as a separate point, that he wasn't an “occupier” at all, much like Donald Trump is not an “occupier” of Native American lands.
I think there are grounds to be surprised and dissatisfied when the school curriculum teaches kids shallow, anti-intellectual ressentiments, instead of actual history, with all its shades of gray. And when it does that, it's awful for their future. Indeed, as one great Polish historian once said, false history is a mistress of false politics. Mistress in the old Shakespearean sense. Although the modern alternate meaning of the word gives the saying quite an appropriate twist…