davetannenbaum
I'll only add that compared to, say, traditional economics we don't have a sense of how unique the problem is to social psych/organizational behavior. In the past decade psychology has done a lot more replication attempts and data auditing than have other fields in the social sciences. So it could be that other fields are equally problematic, but we don't know.
(1) This issue doesn't affect the treatment effect (the difference in return rates for money vs no money), which was the main focus of the paper. If email usage is low in a particular country, that should affect return rates equally in both the money and no money conditions.
(2) We've done a number of robustness checks on the point about email usage and have not been able to find evidence that it has a meaningful impact on the results. For instance, when looking at cross country differences in wallet return rates, the rank order correlation between the "raw" data and one that statistically adjusts for email penetration rates (based on World Bank data) is 0.95.
On targeting front-desk employees, we did this both to allow relatively portable cross-country comparisons and for reasons of internal validity (e.g., if we placed wallets on the ground, then can participants "select" into the study which compromises our ability to draw causal inferences).
On your last point about whether it's dishonest to hold onto a wallet. The question is about the treatment effect --- all things equal, is it more dishonest to hold onto a wallet with money vs no money? We polled nationally representative samples in the US, UK, and Poland and in all three countries most people thought so.
https://ucirvine-my.sharepoint.com/:w:/g/personal/eloftus_ad...
My sense is that our results probably serve as a lower bound on reporting rates -- if the person who dropped off the wallet comes across as a local, reporting rates would be higher. But this is pure speculation.
The disadvantage of using a clear business-card case over a traditional wallet is clear, in that it is relatively unusual. The advantage of using a clear case, however, is that it affords considerably more experimental control in that you can be relatively certain that every recipient knows what is inside. With a wallet, there will be variation in who decides to inspect the wallet, and that introduces selection effects into the experimental design (i.e., are those who are willing to look inside a wallet, compared to those who don't, different in their degree of honesty?). This makes interpreting the evidence a lot more challenging.
FWIW we examined how our measure of civic honesty compares to other known proxies of honest behavior (tax evasion, corruption, etc) within and between countries. If there was something artificial or unique about our setting -- such as using unusual clear business card cases -- then you wouldn't expect our results to generalize or correlate with other measures of honest behavior. However, we find response rates correlate very highly with these other proxies of honesty, suggesting that they are tapping into some broader construct.
1. This is a fair point. In the Supplemental Material, we explore cross-country differences in email usage. When we statistically adjust for country-level differences in email usage (using World Bank data), the country ranking remains essentially the same (adjusted rankings correlate over 0.90 with non-adjusted rankings). Also, when you restrict the data only to drop-offs performed at hotels -- which tend to rely on email more than other settings -- you see the same pattern of results.
2. Also a good point. However, there are mechanical problems with using the marginal differences between conditions -- for example, countries with high reporting rates in the NoMoney condition will be naturally capped in the possible size of the treatment treatment effect, compared to those with low reporting rates. Because the scale is bounded at 0 and 100% you're also fighting against reversion to the mean at the low and high ends of the distribution. FWIW we find that absolute levels of reporting rates correlate very highly with other known proxies of honesty both within and between countries (measures like tax evasion, corruption, etc), whereas relative differences between conditions do not.
3. We explicitly test this by randomly varying whether the wallets contained a key or not (valuable to the owner but not the recipient), while holding the rest of the contents in the wallet constant.
Yes, we only went back for those who contacted us first. Your idea is an interesting one, but it gets at something else (how many people, who otherwise would keep the wallet, instead would turn over the wallet when confronted by the owner). We collected wallets from those who contacted us to rule out the possibility that they are returning the wallets empty.
https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/abs/10.1287/mnsc.1070.071...
Also they claim the body of evidence doesn’t find support for loss aversion. But a meta analysis on the topic does in fact find support for loss aversion (albeit the magnitude is probably smaller than originally thought):
Of course, there are other criteria for rationality besides coherence/consistency (as the wikipedia article alludes to).