cl289

It's not appropriate to say that "Google never intended for it to happen" without proof that that is the case, something which is almost impossible from outside Google. Yahoo and Equifax didn't intend for their breaches to happen either, but at least they do not benefit from them. Companies like Google and Facebook, which are in the advertising/datamining business, have an incentive for "accidental" slippages like road-mapping cars collecting wifi data, "we didn't know" sharing of virtually all user data sent over the internet without encryption with the NSA, over-complicated "privacy" settings, services for which user data "will be kept separate" morphing into "we now share user data across services...," and on and on.

These are the most powerful non-governmental agencies in the world (and more powerful than almost all governments). Developers have to stop giving in particular Google a free pass on virtually everything. We need to stop setting Google DNS servers to be the default in software or in example code. We need to stop pretending that turning separate URL and search boxes into a single omnibox is a great convenience or efficiency of space and recognize that it's just more comprehensive collection of user data. We need to stop turning that ever-smaller remaining free space on the internet, the Web, into another massive spiderweb of signals sent to Google and Facebook, with as many as ten or twenty requests sent to Google from a typical webpage, many of which no longer function when these requests are blocked, because the functionality of the site, and not just the advertising, now comes from Google servers.

Acquiescence to this status quo is easy and probably good for one's career, but it's also dangerous for democracy, dangerous for innovation, dangerous for independence of thought...

If I were in charge of collecting encrypted data at the NSA, I would make sure that whatever keys were used by the CPU's AES instruction set would be copied and saved using the CPU firmware. Then that data could be sent out with the ME, or simply stored in case that computer was ever an object of interest. In that way, anything encrypted (using hardware) could be decrypted. Seems like it would be malpractice by the NSA not to collect AES keys at the hardware level.

Just to clarify as a non-user: there's an online status, and a 'last seen' data point, and both can be queried by any user for any user given their telephone number, as often as the querying party likes? And the online status is when the app is open on the phone?

WWCS (What would Clapper Say):

Nov 15, 2017, to Congress: "I can categorically deny that there were any leaks of this nature during my tenure as Director of National Intelligence."

June 22, 2020: "Well, yes, I did say at the time that I denied it. But I said 'categorically denied'- that is to say, under certain conditions, or categories, this could be denied. That is what I meant and I stand by that. I also used the word 'can,' which is a sort of conditional; look it up in your grammar books. I did not say 'I do deny,' but 'I can deny.' There are conditions that might allow one to deny this assertion: i.e. what exactly is a Russian, what does it mean to leak, or to have leaked, or to have an inadvertant leak. That is what I meant and I stand by that also."

Always a little confused by what 'tiling' is. On gnome I use 'untiled'/overlapping windows, and with SYS-right/left/up/down, ALT-tab, ALT-`, ALT-ESC, etc. shift windows around on gnome. That's it, plus quarter-tiling and definable keyboard combinations?

What would be really useful is a workspace organizer that given a keyboard combination automatically opened a number of applications in preset locations (on a new workspace); i.e. set up a work environment for a specific task. Is that possible with a tiling manager?