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Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by tptacek on Thursday July 23, 2015 @11:09AM (#9936194)
The thing that software security people do that most normal people don't do is: browsing and accessing email in a virtual machine, not their actual machine.
Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by ihsw on Thursday July 23, 2015 @11:21AM (#9936278)
Can we settle for containers instead?

For example, running Chrome in a Docker container. Why not? Drawbacks? Security risks? Feasibility?

I understand that users download things but personally I can't recall doing that in recent memory, other than things like news/tech spec PDFs for later review. Moving downloaded files out of the browser's container would involve a fair bit of ceremony (physically selecting files/folders and dragging them out of the browsers "Download" folder and onto the host's file system, disallowing saving files outside of that folder, and so forth) but it doesn't seem that bad.

What do most users do with a browser other than open the thing, browse websites, and download files for later?

Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by zorked on Thursday July 23, 2015 @11:43AM (#9936441)
Isn't the Chrome sandbox a better assurance than Chrome-under-Docker?

Except for the obscurity angle of course (nobody writes exploits against Chrome-under-Docker).

To be fair, VMs are also mostly about the obscurity angle too, and if you do all your browing in a VM the cookies alone will make the attacker sufficiently happy that they will probably not care. People don't hack because they want root on the bare-metal OS, people hack because they want to steal data. If it's in a VM or container, then getting there is enough.

Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by georgerobinson on Thursday July 23, 2015 @11:55AM (#9936546)
> Isn't the Chrome sandbox a better assurance than Chrome-under-Docker?

Sorry, are you referring to Native Client or Chrome's site isolation?

Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by tptacek on Thursday July 23, 2015 @11:23AM (#9936291)
No. I'm barely on board with the pain/benefit of running an isolation VM. Containers provide so much less isolation than VMs, it's hard to imagine they're worth the inconvenience.

(I hate VMs so much I just use two computers).

Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by thematt on Thursday July 23, 2015 @11:34AM (#9936372)
Why do you hate VM's so much? Usability? Or is there some technical reason?
Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by MichaelGG on Thursday July 23, 2015 @12:52PM (#9936950)
Because VMware has essentially abandoned their client virtualization software? (Workstation 11 is a paid minor bug fix.) While it's way better than VirtualBox, it's still annoying. Stuff like USB devices will randomly not work. You need more system resources, which heats up the machine, making it hot to the touch. Oh and it crashes at times, too. With Windows-on-Windows setup, I was having daily crashes. VMware doesn't seem to care and offers no support with the product (gotta buy a company support plan). They even had a kb article to the effect of "Known issue: Workstation crashes when you run Office 2007".

It's usable, just a bit annoying. I feel little option but to run Windows as a host OS in order to get best driver/video/battery support, so VMware is essentially mandatory.

It's also a huge attack surface.

Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by tptacek on Thursday July 23, 2015 @11:42AM (#9936437)
Just slowness and usability. Also: as a defense, it's imperfect.
Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by atsaloli on Thursday July 23, 2015 @12:44PM (#9936882)
Illumos zones are as lightweight as containers, can run Linux, and provide full isolation of the guest system. www.illumos.org
Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by S4M on Thursday July 23, 2015 @11:51AM (#9936514)
How about using two browsers? one of emails or banking and another one for regular browsing?
Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by jcrawfordor on Friday July 24, 2015 @02:39AM (#9940399)
Most of the banking-information-malware I take a look at hooks multiple browsers from the OS. So the browsers would need to be isolated in a better way than just being different browsers.

Using an uncommon browser for something like banking (Opera or Vivaldi or something) would be a pretty good solution because no one would have bothered to develop the hooks for them, unless the malware is keylogging, which is not uncommon but less popular now than the smarter solution of watching browser form submits on known bank websites.

Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by Fritsdehacker on Thursday July 23, 2015 @11:46AM (#9936471)
It would actually be less secure to run your browser in a Docker container. If an attacker can break out of the container, it has root access to your system.

https://zeltser.com/security-risks-and-benefits-of-docker-ap...

Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by elorant on Thursday July 23, 2015 @11:45AM (#9936460)
What do most users do with a browser other than open the thing, browse websites, and download files for later?

The download part is the scary one. An average user can’t make the distinction between an OS message and a malware disguising as the former. Thus they download shit that wrecks havoc on their PCs. Besides, you could be infected by a compromised Flash banner so you don't even have to download anything.

And I don’t think that containers are a feasible approach for the average user. I doubt VMs are either. Our best bet would be browsers running in an isolation context simulating a VM. But that would require more RAM than the average user has available.

Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by emergentcypher on Thursday July 23, 2015 @11:47AM (#9936488)
> Chrome in a Docker container?

Please dear god no. Kill me now.

Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by lcswi on Thursday July 23, 2015 @03:42PM (#9937995)
Docker does not provide any security.
Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by JupiterMoon on Thursday July 23, 2015 @11:35AM (#9936377)
It's very easy (trivial even?) to browse in e.g. Virtual Box these days - why do the less secure thing?
Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by recursive on Thursday July 23, 2015 @11:38AM (#9936405)
Anything that takes more than a dozen steps is not trivial.
Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by JupiterMoon on Thursday July 23, 2015 @11:45AM (#9936458)
If your using a Linux distro already you have to: 1. install virtual box from package manager 2. download .iso of some distro 3. install 4. update virtual machine 5. browse

Of these someone who's installed their own OS has 2 slightly novel steps. So yeah trivial is maybe the wrong words but still easy.

Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by Eiriksmal on Thursday July 23, 2015 @05:25PM (#9938627)
You forgot step 1.5: spend forever signing the VM kernel modules so they can be started under secure boot. Such pain. Fortunately, once the signature's in the UEFI, upgrading from Fedora 20 to 22 just necessitates resigning the new VirtualBox module without the UEFI steps.

http://gorka.eguileor.com/vbox-vmware-in-secureboot-linux/

Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by recursive on Thursday July 23, 2015 @01:22PM (#9937168)
> If your using a Linux distro

Most people aren't. I think most people haven't installed on OS at all for that matter.

Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by JupiterMoon on Saturday July 25, 2015 @07:36AM (#9947284)
Fair play. I'm around so many people that have that I forget that most haven't.
Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by georgerobinson on Thursday July 23, 2015 @11:59AM (#9936578)
Just to be clear, do you browse and read email in a virtual-machine or is this statement referring to the behaviours of security researchers more generally?

If so, have you ever forgot to use the virtual machine and instead browsed or read email on your host operating system? If so, what did you do?

Furthmore, is it possible to break out of the hypervisor and into the host operating system?

Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by jcrawfordor on Friday July 24, 2015 @02:54AM (#9940448)
Your last question is really, really interesting. The answer is yes in at least one case (https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-0923), but I'm not aware of any real in-the-wild behavior of this sort (that is, not just basically a PoC of that vuln).

Note that that vuln is related to shared directories - anyone using a VM for isolation should probably not use these. I recently heard an amusing story of another infosec professional that cryptowalled their Macbook by testing on a VM with over-generous folder shares. Of course this is an extreme example caused by a clear mistake, but it's food for thought.

Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by lmm on Thursday July 23, 2015 @11:57AM (#9936564)
Non-developers probably do everything that would be valuable to an attacker in the browser and/or via email. (Heck, what else do people do on a computer?)
Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by JoachimSchipper on Thursday July 23, 2015 @12:28PM (#9936776)
You really don't want to hook up your company's network storage to the internet; running a browser without domain credentials should avoid that, in a typical enterprise environment.
Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by djent on Thursday July 23, 2015 @12:33PM (#9936817)
What should I use as a VM environment/OS? Obviously I know GNU/Linux distros, but if all I'm going to be doing is using Firefox, I don't want a 8GB+ VM file hogging space on my normal system. Right now, I only have a 256 GB SSD in my laptop, and have my VMs on an external hard drive, which when plugged in to use uses up 1 out of my 2 USB ports. I would love to browse in a VM if I could get away without using a ton of space on my SSD. Also if you have any suggestions for options that also support high-DPI, that would be great, but not strictly necessary.
Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by kyboren on Thursday July 23, 2015 @06:19PM (#9938854)
Check out Qubes: https://www.qubes-os.org/

You can use Fedora, Debian, Whonix, or Windows in "seamless" mode with minimal effort. It has a composable networking architecture (e.g. easy to make all a VM's traffic go through Tor, whose traffic in turn goes over a VPN). Disposable VMs are a native feature. Template VMs reduce duplication of /; Application VMs use a template VM with CoW / and their own persistent /home.

Qubes uses Fedora 20 for Dom0, so you get all the same graphics support as Fedora gives you.

Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by lucb1e on Thursday July 23, 2015 @01:20PM (#9937151)
I used to use Crunchbang whenever I wanted a lightweight, easy and modern GNU/Linux virtual machine, but they seem to have pulled the plug.

Debian is what I'm most familiar with, so that's my new place to go. Still quite big with a relatively basic install, but not as big as Ubuntu or Linux Mint.

Really lightweight stuff is Damn Small Linux (old) or Puppy Linux (never tried it), but I'm not sure how usable that is for day-to-day tasks.

Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by edison_carter on Thursday July 23, 2015 @02:52PM (#9937734)
Crunchbang++ is a solid community effort to continue the late, lamented Crunchbang

https://crunchbangplusplus.org/

Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by pothibo on Thursday July 23, 2015 @11:43AM (#9936447)
I'm wondering if this idea will make it to the browser vendor so that their whole runtime is by default in a VM.
Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by transpute on Thursday July 23, 2015 @11:51AM (#9936518)
Bromium loads each HTTP request in a separate "micro VM". A subset of their technology will be in Win 10: http://learn.bromium.com/microsoft-partnership.html
Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by EdwardCoffin on Thursday July 23, 2015 @11:15AM (#9936232)
I'm a bit surprised that using a virtual machine was mentioned nowhere in the paper.

Edit: I'm also surprised that we have such a large proportion of this discussion talking about something (using VMs) that is mentioned nowhere in the paper the thread is supposedly about. Perhaps if we were also discussing the (apparently) surprising fact that it was not mentioned it would make sense (to me, anyway).

Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by sarciszewski on Thursday July 23, 2015 @11:14AM (#9936226)
This is true. I'm hoping the "browse in a VM" thing catches on with the public, even if it's for the "I want to hide my browser history from my significant other" sort of reasons.
Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by JoshTriplett on Thursday July 23, 2015 @11:46AM (#9936468)
Browsing makes sense, but why email? Unless you run an OS and email client that 1) renders HTML mail by default (making you vulnerable to browser engine attacks) or 2) makes it too easy to run executable email attachments, then is an email client really higher risk than many other pieces of software?
Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by ghshephard on Thursday July 23, 2015 @12:23PM (#9936747)
Any time you provide a vector for an attacker, you run the risk of being exploited. Email is even worse than web browsing, because an attacker has the ability to send it to you, rather than waiting for you to go to their site.

I would never claim to know my email-renderer so well that I was 100% confident that it didn't have any attack vectors, particularly with all the crazy things you can do with unicode nowadays - much more straightforward to just read it in a virtual-machine. That way, even if you guessed wrong on the attack surface of your email client, the damage is contained.

Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by sliverstorm on Thursday July 23, 2015 @03:27PM (#9937913)
Even more straightforward still to hire a Mechanical Turk to read your email to you over the phone, and there's no risk of viruses capable of VM breakout!
Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by nmcfarl on Thursday July 23, 2015 @12:22PM (#9936740)
My personal work email flow involves clicking a lot of links. Email is quite tied to web browsing for me, so if I wanted to make sure that all of my browsing was done in a VM, and I wanted to make it convenient, I would do my emailing from the same VM
Re:Comparing how security experts and non-experts stay safe ... by emergentcypher on Thursday July 23, 2015 @11:48AM (#9936492)
So you could say that the VM is a sort of browser condom...