But an unsigned software repository that calls post install scripts seems just as absolutely easy to modify, and we see those regularly.
My software is most easily installed with a piped bash script. In the script contents, I try to explain what's going on. I also at the top indicate that you shouldn't just trust what I am telling you. And then in the documentation, where you are told how to run the script, I tell you to be cautious there as well. (The script just installs the repository, and from there it's all signed and delivered over https).
I could never get over how easy it would be to whitewash a bash script with an rpm just to get some psychological credibility.
If it's not signed and/or delivered over https, it's completely hackable.
That first step of trust, how?
Of course you have to make sure the original install is trustworthy; all you can really do for that is compare the .iso checksum on several different machines. If all those machines are compromised (or there's a hardware-level compromise of your machine) then you're doomed, but that at least makes attacking a lot more costly than it would otherwise be.
So, never blindly pipe the web into your bash, kids.