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Re:Doas – Dedicated OpenBSD application subexecutor by leni536 on Monday July 20, 2015 @07:06AM (#9915190)
Does anybody can use sudo in a way that it adds additional but limited privileges to certain user groups securely? I'm sure it's used only for giving admin privileges to the admin group 99% of the time. If your OS needs a tool that allows users to run processes as another user then maybe your OS needs finer access controls instead.

And for the 99% use case I think a few lines long C code would suffice.

Re:Doas – Dedicated OpenBSD application subexecutor by ghshephard on Monday July 20, 2015 @07:28AM (#9915257)
sudo (at least everywhere I've used it) - is typically used to (A) allow me to run code as root without having to type my password, and (B) give select groups of people the rights to run a few specific commands. In terms of number-of-time executed, in a recent environment that I was in, in which approximately 100 or so people had sudo rights, 90+% of the time it was to allow people in various group to run commands like "tcpdump" or "netstat", without giving them full root rights to the system.
Re:Doas – Dedicated OpenBSD application subexecutor by thaumaturgy on Monday July 20, 2015 @03:42PM (#9918488)
The correct way to set up BackupPC to run full disk backups against a remote system is to create a backuppc user on that system and then add an entry to your sudoers file for the most restrictive possible backuppc command. Here's an example from one of my servers:

    backuppc ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/rsync --server --sender ?*
This primarily is to help limit the amount of damage that backuppc can do if something very strange happens and it decides to try to eat the filesystem.
Re:Doas – Dedicated OpenBSD application subexecutor by wooger on Monday July 20, 2015 @01:05PM (#9917375)
Yes.

One example I've used was setting up some non-technical windows users with a shortcut they could click which would:

do a key-based, passwordless ssh login to the server rotate a proxy log, specific to their test machine

The logrotate config for these logs included code to move a copy to a mapped network share.

So clicking the shortcut caused the log for their most recent bout of testing to magically appear in a folder on their desktop.

The sudoers file allowed only this command to be run by these users. They did not get shell access at any stage.