Say you discover a very powerful attack on AES which allows you under many circumstances to recover the key:
1. do you have an ethical obligation to warn affected parties?
2. If you don't and instead secretly sell this decryption capability to governments and/or private actors, do you have an obligation to ensure that this capability isn't used illegally or unethically?
3. What due diligence is required to protect a vulnerability of this scale?
I just think we should be clear that exploit developers, brokers, and users don't actually create vulnerabilities; software companies do.
I also think people should give Adobe a little bit of a break --- not much of one, but a little. Adobe got monstrously successful off a codebase that largely predates the concept of software security. It's a nightmare problem for them, and they are working on it. They should work harder.
First, they were incompetent enough to not correctly develop their software.
Second, non-assholes would have a standing price-match policy for bugs. Adobe should give you 110% of the highest bid you get for any 0-day. They could have fixed these a long time ago if they'd paid the discoverer $45k (or $150k -- times three for exclusivity.) These companies are effectively outsourcing security testing and remediation of their software, then whinging that independent developers don't work for free.
I agree Adobe is at fault for producing insecure software.
Blame is not a limited resource, there is always extra blame to go around. If I am driving recklessly and my brakes fail due to a manufacturing error, both I and the car company are at fault for the accident. One can always, as HT has done, make a bad situation worse but behaving in a reckless and unethical matter.
>Adobe should give you 110% of the highest bid you get for any 0-day.
This! This so hard.
(For that matter, while reputation is certainly a thing, what stops a security researcher from selling the same 0-day to several different buyers, and then selling it to the company to fix? Do the typical contracts to sell 0-days involve continued payment based on the amount of time the bug remains unfixed?)
And if a security dev resells, who cares? The company still got the 0-day and still gets it fixed asap. It's far better than our current situation where these can persist for years.
People willing to pay 5 or 6-digit sums for a zero-day are likely... not nice. One wouldn't double-cross them willy-nilly. Multiple-sale to multiple third-parties scenarios are likely happening every day, but selling to developers could be considered an act of sabotage against all buyers, so there is no incentive really.
2. If one is the kind of person that thinks that the answer to 1 is no then probably the answer to 2 is no too (sorry if this sounds harsh).
3. Probably an effort proportional to the competitive advantage it gives to you.
Thanks.