Having been subjected to the government's definition of "agile" before[1], I can tell you that nearly everyone who was at least barely competent technically[2] thought the processes were asinine. The problem is that nobody could convince the government customers and non-technical management of this. The government in particular was bad, as their reps (GS and contractor) often came in with a dictatorial, know-it-all attitude about the problems they were hiring us to solve.
This team managed to do what they did because they were outsiders brought in specifically to fix a high-profile fuck-up. I'm willing to bet that most of what they did was suggested at some point by people who worked on the broken system, but it was shot down. The success of the second effort was primarily political.
[1] The Gantt chart bit brought back memories that made me want to throw things.
[2] Despite stereotypes to the contrary, most developers and engineers working at government contractors are at least barely competent. Contractors with mature engineering orgs (Raytheon, Boeing, Lockheed, etc) are better as they tend to force the fuck-ups out pretty quickly.
This is true. But having recently talked with a number of people at 18F and the USDS, I think the enormous scale of the high-profile fuckup is serving as a great example to persuade people that things should be done differently.
For example, note that the government is trying to change the purchasing processes that drive heavyweight methods and delivery of monoliths:
https://18f.gsa.gov/2015/01/08/creating-a-federal-marketplac...
Having said that, there is one three-letter monolith that commands the plurality of the Federal budget and shows absolutely no inclinations to change. They have resisted intrusion by USDS and 18F thus far, and I can tell you from direct experience that their information systems and policies are atrocious. Hopefully 18F, USDS, and similar efforts can eventually penetrate the Five-Sided Playpen, but it is going to be a long, hard slog.