Given that the listed businesses are still operating and in most cases continuing to turn similar profits to what they were doing before, they appear to have done an excellent job weighing the costs in play.
You're welcome to think that the cost to the business should be higher, either due to the public caring more (most paying customers at the moment don't even consider whether the businesses they support care about security) or due to increased fines and penalties for security failings. It may very well be that we need to adjust those things via raising awareness or changing legislation. But based on the current state of the world, these businesses all weighed things in a way that kept them doing what they do.
These aren't statements made to the board, they're PR statements made to outsiders after huge breaches of customer/employee personal info. No one is reassured in these times by a company being "serious" about security in the sense that they have supposedly calculated its expected impact on their profitability.
> Given that the listed businesses are still operating and in most cases continuing to turn similar profits to what they were doing before, they appear to have done an excellent job weighing the costs in play.
You can't know whether (even in an internal bookkeeping sense) the "tradeoff" was net positive. The incidents still cost the companies money.
BP still exists and is highly profitable despite the spill and the ongoing costs incurred. That doesn't mean, hey they must have given it serious thought and found it costs more to inspect and maintain the rig than the $50B+ spent cleaning it up.
I don't think security can be taken seriously unless specifically compliance is taken seriously.
I claim something that few security professionals would say in their career: Compliance is the magic bullet to taking privacy and security seriously. But to understand why, we have to think about the the most reasonable alternative to compliance as an approach to security.
Do you know what “full content packet capture” means? It’s when you’re able to grab every piece of data transmitted over a network using a tool called tcpdump. You can use another tool to reassemble those collected data packets into complete applications, movie or music files, even video chats and phone calls.
As a joke, an instructor once told me that when they went onsite to do security investigations, they would do a full content dump; if someone was downloading videos at the time, my instructor would say, “Thanks for the movie, guys!”
This is what the Utah Data Center is doing. All packets are collected using a tool like tcpdump, and then the Center reassembles them and categorizes the content into data cubes (e.g., movies, video calls, emails) that are easily findable with open source search engines such as Lucene and Solr. Is this taking security seriously? You bet!
Enhanced Intrusions Detection Systems is how security is being taken seriously and with a cost to privacy. If a hosting provider like Akamai — which, runs 15% of the world’s web traffic — is able to reassemble your packets, and even archive them, is that what you want security to be?
Probably not, but when a security professional says "let's take security seriously", to them it means just watch all the things. I remember in 2006, after my IDS training, I was all for collecting every single packet (no matter what) because I was taught as a security professional, that was the only way I could do my job: watch everything, since we need to know everything about anything. If you watch everything, that’s inherently security, and the world is protected. That was my modus operandi for many years.
This is why taking privacy and security seriously really means taking compliance seriously. Compliance lassos in "watch everything" while also providing validation and proof of security. If we’re doing good hygiene (e.g. Key rotation, log review, Change Control) on our systems, there’s no reason to collect and watch everything.
The recipe to collect everything already exists but that means only security is being taken seriously. I hope we start to take compliance seriously and bring that into the privacy/security equation.
Option 1. Collect all the things.
Option 2. Just do good hygiene.
Aside from these two options, what else is available to provide a most reasonable approach to protecting our customer's sensitive data?
EDIT: I'm the head of a compliance agency
Your previous 2 comments seem to be drawing a very strange dichotomy where the only options for "security" are "capture all traffic" and "compliance". I'm not even sure where to begin in responding to that, because it's so far beyond any facts you provided in either update.
Neither compliance nor traffic capture are "security". Capturing and analyzing traffic can be a facet of a security stance, and structured compliance frameworks can provide structure and goalposts for measuring your security stance, but there's a near-infinite range of other factors at play here.
This video is proof: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R63CRBNLE2o
Other security researchers have gone so far as suggesting Penetration Testing and Risk Assessment are the most reasonable approaches to providing security for sensitive data.
Businesses have to architect for the world we have, yes, but still.
If something doesn't hit their bottom line, should a commercial company, who is predicated on providing shareholder value care about it?
Personally as distateful as it is, I think the only way to amke companies take proper account of externalities is regulation / law.
If you take the example of health and safety, or building regulations, there is a reason why those are (in many countries) enshrined in law and not done by companies spontaneously.
It just turns out that most people are actually perfectly okay with periodic security breaches as long as the hassle from it is substantially below the amortized savings from less hassle in their day-to-day usage.
So all of your data is protected according to that risk profile, adjusted to feedback as we get data on customer sensitivities.
You know, like a professional manages assets.
People love to hate companies for their security practices when a breach happens. It's much harder to form a dispassionate, nuanced view from a place of critical thinking.
Security is bloody difficult, even for lauded members of the community. Schneier apologises in his blog when he says he still uses Windows, for example.
"All of these companies have decided that the risk of losing this data was worth the cost savings of not protecting against the attack. So far they all seem to be right (not even Sony went out of business after their massive breach)."
"Went out of business" is not the right criteria for saying "they were right". The question is whether (the EV of) the cost of a breach exceeded (the EV of) the cost of protecting against a breech. It's probable that the delta between those two was not enough to put Sony out of business - they're a massive company with high margins.
If they don't have such a clause, then I don't think they take the security of their clients' data very seriously.
They should instead say that they take their business seriously, and don't care about the security of their clients' data as long as they don't walk away.
So it's perfectly reasonable for them to say they take security seriously and then have these breaches. They take it exactly as seriously as needed to keep their business alive.
Having been on that eBay security team mentioned, I can tell you that we did in fact take security seriously. And sometimes what we recommended was done, and sometimes it was decided the cost wasn't worth the risk. But we were always serious about it.