Your explanation, that the diffuser doesn't make it Hard, is understandable and it's not something I'd worry about. And the way you phrase it, it seems unarguable and straightforward that it isn't a big deal, that no one should ever rely on FDE for integrity. But Bruce understands a lot more than me, and he's citing this as a big deal. And MS/Ferguson originally made a big deal out of it. So was it always just a useless add-on? Wouldn't someone have published a paper showing how Elephant doesn't really help? Certainly a practical attack on it would be notable?
I hope you can appreciate my confusion.
Anyways, my reasoning:
1. The diffuser didn't really help for serious threat scenarios, and hurt perf, so no one should be upset by its removal. This seems to be true.
2. But MS previously called the diffuser critical and has made no statements as to the security impact of the removal. (Indeed, there are easy attacks without the diffuser, but no known attacks with it.)
3. A well-known cryptographer (Bruce's actual cryptography credentials are undoubted, correct?) cites the removal as a reason to be suspicious.
If 1 is true, which I think it is, then 2 and 3 are at odds with how reality should be. No matter how confident I am in 1, points 2 and 3 require a shift in the probability of 1. Or, I am misunderstanding 2 and 3.
How else should I evaluate these things? Sorry for being dense or wasting your time.
Again though: if the lack of a "diffuser" is a reason to be "suspicious" of Bitlocker, it should be possible to explain why that would be. I tried to address that concern head-on. It bugs me that we keep having to flee back to "but Schneier is concerned".
That did a lot of damage to all attempts to teach password security to laymen.
OTOH he was one of the first "famous" security people to publicly recommend writing down passwords.
So all in all he is certainly a net win.
Schneier is much less of a factor in real-world crypto than generalist developers think he is.
I feel bad blaming him for it; it's not his fault that people who don't do serious work in cryptography have made him a cryptographic folk hero. On the other hand: there are still people using Blowfish because his name is on it, so maybe I don't feel bad blaming him.
Cryptography Engineering is something I hold very dear and have lent out to colleagues. Very well written, so it's an enjoyable read. And a good length, not a thousand pages tome.
My main problem with Schneier at this point is that he pivotted (Ha! This is HN after all...) from cryptography and technical analyses to political commentary. And I haven't found him very convincing in that regard. Even annoying at times.
To make a simple comparison: if someone smarter than me says 2+2=5, my probability of 2+2=4 will move go down from (1 - epsilon) to something a bit lower.
Unfortunately, it reduced the security of Bitlocker in a way that is only marginally relevant to Bitlocker's goals, and in a way that is very, very difficult to explain to people who don't routinely work with cryptography.
So it's hard to crisply refute Schneier on this point, even as we have to watch the alarming spectacle of him recommending a rando disk encryption program that offers Blowfish, CAST, and GOST encryption.
I think it's best summarized as:
"Removing the Elephant diffuser doesn’t entirely break BitLocker. If someone steals your laptop, they still won’t be able to unlock your disk and access your files. But they might be able to modify your encrypted disk and give it back to you in order to hack you the next time you boot up"
Vanilla CBC makes it easier to mount attacks, and XTS makes it harder, and the diffuser may have even made it incrementally harder. But no notion of difficulty here deserves the uppercased "Hard" we're looking for with cryptography: at best, you concede attackers "only" the ability to randomize targeted ranges of stored bytes, which --- especially for the mountains of C code we call "operating systems" --- is a devastating vulnerability.
If you are seriously worried about Highly Capable Attackers, and you lose custody of your laptop, you should consider writing it off.