LibreCrypt is useful against very specific threats. Protecting against attackers that have repeated physical access to your PC, and the technical nous to install keyloggers etc. involves way more than just using a particular Windows program, no matter it's features.
I'll go even farther than parent: If your adversary is determined enough, you should assume that any physical access to your machine, for however short a period, means you should never ever use it again - and that you have no practical way to know if said access has indeed compromised your machine. See e.g., Thunderstrike.
corollary: You can never be sure that your machine, which has passed through 10 different hands (factory, tester, packages, store, courier, ...) is not trojaned to begin with.
If the OS partition is unencrypted, it is easier to trojan a system if you have access to it without the key (just replace some executable that is bound to execute sooner or later). Also, a lot of cruft remains there such as temporary files, registry updates, etc; e.g. even if you work on a Word file inside an encrypted container, you might find enough parts of it in swap space, temporary files, registry etc - all of which are unencrypted.
Other than swap and system partitions, there should be no difference. But some programs will leak info regardless - it's better to have everything encrypted than just some parts.