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Re:LibreCrypt: Transparent on-the-fly disk encryption for Wi... by johnchristopher on Saturday June 06, 2015 @03:50AM (#9670068)
Considering this point :

> LibreCrypt does not support encryption of the operating system partition, for this we recommend Ubuntu Linux.

What are the benefits of encrypting a partition over using an encrypted file mounted as a partition ?

Re:LibreCrypt: Transparent on-the-fly disk encryption for Wi... by beagle3 on Saturday June 06, 2015 @05:07AM (#9670206)
Note they are discussion the OS partition, not just any partition.

If the OS partition is unencrypted, it is easier to trojan a system if you have access to it without the key (just replace some executable that is bound to execute sooner or later). Also, a lot of cruft remains there such as temporary files, registry updates, etc; e.g. even if you work on a Word file inside an encrypted container, you might find enough parts of it in swap space, temporary files, registry etc - all of which are unencrypted.

Other than swap and system partitions, there should be no difference. But some programs will leak info regardless - it's better to have everything encrypted than just some parts.

Re:LibreCrypt: Transparent on-the-fly disk encryption for Wi... by tdk on Sunday June 07, 2015 @08:10AM (#9674325)
It is entirely possible to trojan a system with an encrypted OS partition, by using a bootkit. For extra security, you should boot off a removable medium. Even this can be attacked if the BIOS is infected.

LibreCrypt is useful against very specific threats. Protecting against attackers that have repeated physical access to your PC, and the technical nous to install keyloggers etc. involves way more than just using a particular Windows program, no matter it's features.

Re:LibreCrypt: Transparent on-the-fly disk encryption for Wi... by beagle3 on Sunday June 07, 2015 @10:43AM (#9674796)
Indeed, note I said "easier" and pointed one of the easier ways enabled by lack of OS partition encryption.

I'll go even farther than parent: If your adversary is determined enough, you should assume that any physical access to your machine, for however short a period, means you should never ever use it again - and that you have no practical way to know if said access has indeed compromised your machine. See e.g., Thunderstrike.

corollary: You can never be sure that your machine, which has passed through 10 different hands (factory, tester, packages, store, courier, ...) is not trojaned to begin with.

Re:LibreCrypt: Transparent on-the-fly disk encryption for Wi... by johnchristopher on Saturday June 06, 2015 @05:50AM (#9670281)
Ah, I see. I missed that point, thank you.