...the other issue is that you need a way to atomically update the data block and authenticator together. This is a similar problem to the "RAID write hole", and doing this at the block layer requires even more overhead - something equivalent to RAID write intent bitmaps.
The filesystem, on the other hand, already tends to have a journal, log-structure or COW rules that allows some form of atomic transactional updates. The encryption authenticator can piggy-back on this.
SSDs have fairly large page sizes and erase block sizes, so you're often reading and writing a lot more than necessary, anyway. A clever implementation might be able to take advantage of that to scatter the MAC throughout the drive without too much impact on performance or longevity.
1) The filesystem can be configured to expose different parts of the tree to different users, whereas FDE is all-or-nothing.
2) The filesystem can make room for more metadata than a block device, so it would be easier to implement authenticated encryption.
3) More fine-tuned control over caching.
But are these really significant advantages?
1) Most devices nowadays, including Chromesbooks and Android phones, are only ever used by one person.
2) We could modify dm-crypt to set aside a certain amount of space for MAC, and just expose a smaller block device to the next layer. Besides, the proposed changes to ext4 don't use authenticated encryption, either.
3) Can't this be addressed at a lower level?