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Re:Bitcointalk Server Compromised by imaginenore on Sunday May 24, 2015 @02:56PM (#9597152)
Yes, he is talking about real dice. He comes from Bitcoin security point of view: don't trust anything.

Dice, being physical objects outside of computer networks can be trusted to a pretty good degree.

When it comes to creating something random on a computer, it's actually incredibly hard to guarantee randomness. Most RNGs are black boxes or are so non-transparent that they might as well be black boxes.

You might have an idea how your *nix /dev/random works, but can you actually guarantee your OS is not compromised? Can your guarantee your BIOS is not compromised? Can you guarantee that your hardware is not compromised?

That's why if you want a truly secure Bitcoin cold storage, you generate a wallet offline using something like dice or coinflips (dice are quicker).

Re:Bitcointalk Server Compromised by Dylan16807 on Sunday May 24, 2015 @03:06PM (#9597187)
I don't quite follow your logic. You still need an airgapped computer to turn those random bits into a working address, don't you? Is there a way to do that by hand?

Is it more likely that the RNG is compromised than the bitcoin software?

Re:Bitcointalk Server Compromised by imaginenore on Sunday May 24, 2015 @04:02PM (#9597364)
Yes, but you have eliminated one vector of attack - a faulty or compromised RNG.

> Is it more likely that the RNG is compromised than the bitcoin software?

1) That's a weird question. It's not like they are mutually exclusive. Both are possible. Dice allows you to eliminate the RNG problems.

2) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Random_number_generator_attack#...

Re:Bitcointalk Server Compromised by Dylan16807 on Sunday May 24, 2015 @05:47PM (#9597754)
If I think the risk is high enough to worry about, I'm going to use a method that gets close to eliminating it. I'm not going to settle for only removing one vector.
Re:Bitcointalk Server Compromised by imaginenore on Monday May 25, 2015 @06:00AM (#9599334)
So don't. Using an airgapped computer will not save you against against a compromised RNG (e.g. reduced entropy). Your computer-generated numbers might look random to you, but you can't really be sure.
Re:Bitcointalk Server Compromised by Dylan16807 on Monday May 25, 2015 @09:10AM (#9599893)
>So don't.

Isn't that my argument? Maybe I should try again to clarify my position.

'Just' an airgapped computer solves neither backdoored RNG nor backdoored bitcoin software.

A trusted airgapped computer comes close to solving both.

Using dice only gives me half a solution; why bother?

Re:Bitcointalk Server Compromised by imaginenore on Tuesday May 26, 2015 @05:59AM (#9603742)
Airgapped computer definitely solves the compromised software/firmware problem, because it can't send your private keys to the attacker.
Re:Bitcointalk Server Compromised by Dylan16807 on Wednesday May 27, 2015 @02:04PM (#9613195)
Compromised software can do anything a compromised RNG can do and more. Especially with something finicky like asymmetric crypto.