This gives a pretty clear indication in whose interest the ECB works. Namely in the interest of the majority of the board members.
(...)
The ECB was modelled on the German Bundesbank. As a result, it is one of the world’s most politically independent central banks; its mandate is focused narrowly on price stability; it does not take broader economic goals like unemployment into account in the way other central banks, such as the Fed, do; and it is de facto more restricted than other central banks, since controversial measures can lead to complex political and legal struggles, involving 18 (soon to be 19) countries. Its setup and philosophy are therefore ‘German‘, that is, conservative and cautious.
(...)
A wide range of studies have so far failed to establish a firm consensus on the influence of various countries on the ECB during the euro’s first decade. However, most studies have found that the ECB behaved like a multinational central bank, in which each country has a weight proportional to the size of its economy.
This gave Germany a higher weight than other countries because it is the largest economy in the eurozone.
But it is hard to argue that there was a German bias at the ECB before the crisis. In the post-crisis period, the ECB has failed to stabilise the economy, and inflation has fallen to just 0.3 per cent. It is tempting to see this as the product of a German bias, because the German economy has suffered least from the ECB’s hesitation to do more. But it is hard to argue that German pressure prevented the ECB from lowering rates faster during the last two years, for example, or managing the inflation expectations of consumers and investors more aggressively. Rather, the ECB’s misjudgement of the economic dynamic in the eurozone prevented a more timely and aggressive stance. However, now that the ECB has to move further into unconventional territory to correct its previous errors – potentially by buying government bonds – Draghi has taken German resistance into account and delayed quantitative easing (QE).
(...)
In the governing council of the ECB, all relevant monetary policy decisions are taken by simple majority, with the smaller countries having one vote each, and the larger countries traditionally two (because of the additional votes of executive board members). Some of the more fundamental decisions, like recapitalising the ECB, need a two-thirds majority, based on the ECB’s capital shares, but even then Germany has no veto. What is more, there is currently a clear majority for more aggressive ECB action in the council, which Draghi can draw upon whenever he decides that the time is right. Formally, there is no need for German approval, either from Berlin or from the Bundesbank. Why, then, is Draghi waiting for German approval? There are two possible reasons. First, he might consider it unwise to conduct monetary policy in the face of opposition from the largest eurozone country. There is some merit to this view but it loses validity when the ECB is failing to fulfil its inflation mandate by a wide margin, as it is now.
(...)
Even the relatively cautious OECD has now come out in favour of further monetary stimulus, and the IMF has been urging the ECB to do more for a while. Given that the Fed and the Bank of England have bought government bonds on a massive scale, the ECB would be well in line with consensus views on monetary policy if it did the same.
(...)
The second reason why Draghi might want to get Germany’s backing is that he may fear losing the German government’s consent for the ECB’s other operations, which are not strictly monetary policy. The most important of these, of course, is the OMT programme, which was announced during a panic-driven run on eurozone government bonds in the summer of 2012. The ECB declared that it intended to buy unlimited quantities of these bonds if the panic did not subside – which it then duly did. This programme makes the ECB the implicit guardian of the eurozone as the lender of last resort to governments, but the OMT is in part a fiscal operation. Without the support of Germany, the country with the deepest pockets, the OMT might fail. Draghi therefore does not need the Bundesbank’s support but that of Merkel and the German government – which has backed him on the OMT.
http://www.cer.org.uk/insights/ecb-not-german-central-bank#s...
[I]t is hard to argue that German pressure prevented the ECB from lowering rates faster during the last two years, for example, or managing the inflation expectations of consumers and investors more aggressively.
The article says quite clearly that the ECB has been going against German interests and wishes.Because it goes on and on about how Germany affected ECB for several paragraphs, and explains the reasons and how.
Italy pulled this same stunt in the past; mostly as a way to avoid actually fixing the many problems with the economy here. Floating exchange rates are good in some ways, but those kinds of devaluations are problematic in many ways: you're basically stealing wealth from savers in order to goose export industries a bit, until your crappy economic policies come back to bite you yet again and you need to repeat the cycle.
(2) Greece can change its exchange rate. Just declare bankruptcy and leave the Euro.
(2) Which would fuck with the EU a lot more than it would bother Greece, which is why they're making the stand that they are, they know they have less to lose.
There's a reason they haven't been kicked out already. ;)
(2) I agree that that's the game Greece has been playing. But it's perfectly compatible with what I said.
Germany makes its money on manufactured-goods exports, though, so an artificially cheap currency helps them.
Knowing what we do about human history, why would you assume that kindness-filled all-classes-living-in-harmony! rhetoric has much descriptive power?
With a king, a feudal lord or a pharaoh you can see the "class" thing and the exploitation immediately -- why think that with a modern man that has 1000x times the money and resources of his fellow citizens it's any different? Because democracy?
"Germany is still exporting like gangbusters [to Greece] despite the poor country being in its fifth year of recession. In fact, Germany’s trade surplus per person with Greece is 3.6 times bigger than that with the U.S. (290 euro per Greek versus 81 euro per American)."
Given that Greece is 'paying' for these imports with borrowed money, which is unlikely ever to be paid back, how is this setup benefitting?Exports deficits are benefitting the exporter only if eventually the importers pay. But we are seeing that the importers are unwilling/unable to pay.
Moreover the article says
Euro itself collapsed, resulting in Germany’s higher positive trade balance.
Well, the Euro collapsed for everybody, so all other Euro members had exactly the same benefit.> Given that Greece is 'paying' for these imports with borrowed money, which is unlikely ever to be paid back, how is this setup benefitting?
> Well, the Euro collapsed for everybody, so all other Euro members had exactly the same benefit.
I don't know if you're trolling me or not. Maybe you should read a little bit about the context before engaging into similar discussions.
A few good starting points:
Macronomics: http://www.amazon.com/Macroeconomics-3rd-Edition-Paul-Krugma...
[2] http://www.amazon.com/Currency-Wars-Making-Global-Crisis-ebo...
Also read about public debts what they are and how they did evolve.
Finally, you're looking financial answers to a political problem. Strictly financially speaking, debt restructuring is the only sensible solution to Greece AND everyone else. What you're watching, is a live show of poor justifications from failed politicians (all over the EU).
The inability to do this benefited Germany, at the cost of Greece.