>I mean, it's less exciting when you break that down into the what it means for a person to be aware of themselves. For me, it breaks down to neurons & symbols, well-known scientific domains.
I'm not aware of "neurons and symbols". I'm aware of feeling, sight, smell, etc.. The fact that consciousness is an experience is what's fundamentally at odds with building a consistent model. Modeling cognition is the easy part.
> I'm aware of feeling, sight, smell, etc..
a), you can have that thought only because of symbols, and b), people without thought can feel, see, smell, etc. I don't see how your argument holds any weight.
You mean Douglas Hofstadter.
I mean, it's less exciting when you break that down into the what it means for a person to be aware of themselves. For me, it breaks down to neurons & symbols, well-known scientific domains. While I may not be right, it's not difficult to come up with plausible explanations for the phenomena humans experience. Most of the mystery comes from it being very difficult for most people to even define consciousness. Much of the syntax we have for it (in the west, at least) is cobbled together from various religions, spiritualities, and extremely, extremely dense philosophers read by few and understood by fewer.
You might find Richard Hofstadter's Book "I Am A Strange Loop" illuminating if you find my explanation meager.