Even if they admit to spoofing as a general activity, they're just talking about the common case. They're not placing orders with unconditional intention to cancel.
Well that doesn't lead to a very helpful law...
In this particular case, the trader in question would have been financially ruined if his spoofed orders had been executed, so it's pretty clear he didn't intend for them to be.
Caveat: In my opinion, this isn't a distinction well suited to the criminal justice system. I'd rather that exchanges identify probable spoofers and ban them from trading (after some warnings), with the burden of proof (in arbitration) on the accused to show that the suspicious orders were part of a legitimate strategy.
Are you sure? If he bought the stocks at the heightened price he could just resell them right away. I'd have expected it would take a much more permanent shift to ruin him.
Or if I put it another way: It seems to me that there is a solid method for making money that's 95% the same as spoofing and 5% actually being happy when your "fake" orders execute. So the intent is still to manipulate the market but only through truthful orders. Then you can no longer look at this pattern of behavior and say that it's overwhelmingly likely to be spoofing. Now what do you do? Do any laws stop this?
If a program uses AI to come up with strategies, how do you make sure it doesn't learn to spoof? Coming up with the goal-formulation of "don't spoof" seems like it would require the program to introspect about its own intent. Dunno, I would like to hear what kind of metrics one would use to make the learning algorithm reject spoofing strategies. I guess it would be something similar to whatever heuristics the SEC uses to flag potential spoofing, but they get a lot of false positives and almost never convict someone on metrics.