And this doesn't even start counting applications, and their update and patch mechanisms.
Its still a losing battle though. Run http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb896645.asp... for a few minutes, and look at how many actions are being taken, just when your computer is supposedly idle. Trying to whitelist each and every one of those would be massive overhead.
I've found (personally, this isn't for everyone) is to run with as minimal AV as possible (Right now, SSE), and if I notice anything out of the ordinary run an offline virus scan. I usually do this with Bart-PE, although I've been working on another method for it. Expecting an infected OS to report that it is infected isn't the best idea, it is too easy to fake the results. Doing a scan of the system while the OS is not running tends to be more reliable and remove any problems a lot easier. I'm currently working on a system which will PXE boot once a month, do a virus scan or two (with different, fully updated scanners), defrag, checkdisk and do a general cleanup.
There might also be naughty reasons to do these things
Delete files in the application's working directory, read files from the application's working directory or public areas, contact websites, read keyboard when this application is the focus, send email.
It isn't nearly as dangerous. Sure, you've still got the computer contacting webistes and sending email, but that isn't a terribly large risk. There is still a need for blacklisting that sort of activity. As far as reading sensitive information, however, as long as working directories are categorized well, and used by any applications dealing with anything sensitive, it isn't a problem.
"And whitelists aren't a panacea, either: they don't defend against malware that attaches itself to data files (think Word macro viruses), for example."
If you use a service like gmail then you can't even send certain attachments. I couldn't send .zip files the last I checked. Plus spam filtering has gotten better.
I think white-listing could go a very long way towards solving the problem.
How can a whitelist prevent attack vectors as varied as opening a PDF file designed to exploit your PDF reader? The user cannot always be vigilant enough to know that site X is giving him a malicious file to open. Hell, site X might actually be a legitimate site that has itself been attacked and exploited...
However, I can't receive zip files through my work email which is a policy decision made by our network admins. (You can rename it .zipX or something like that and it will go through. They have been burnt by users clicking on any random attachment and getting Trojans and viruses.)
I don't seem to be able to send an exe through GMail though.
- http://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/d...