Re:Anonabox Analysis
by yellowapple on Monday April 06, 2015 @06:14PM
(#9331003)
This is likely the reason why the Anonabox generates random SSIDs; it forces the user to expect to have to connect to a new network regularly, and additionally reduces the amount of time available for an attacker to attempt to create a duplicate AP.
Of course, even this tactic isn't foolproof, and it's made rather ineffective by Anonabox's rather glaring flaws, but I can understand the rationale.
That idea doesn't work, though. Most devices/OSes remember your last access point, and will, upon a Anonabox failure / deauth / whatever, happily reconnect to your regular (non-Tor!) WiFi AP. That instantly compromises you. Changing the Anonabox SSID doesn't change that.
It is a tremendously bad idea to route all of your traffic through Tor. It completely breaks the Tor security/privacy model.
Negative bonus points for doing it as a WiFi AP - that's a great way to accidentally reconnect to a different AP when your connection to the Tor AP drops, and immediately tie your Tor traffic to your regular connection through automatic reconnects.