And arguing about the merits we should.
It is a tremendously bad idea to route all of your traffic through Tor. It completely breaks the Tor security/privacy model.
Negative bonus points for doing it as a WiFi AP - that's a great way to accidentally reconnect to a different AP when your connection to the Tor AP drops, and immediately tie your Tor traffic to your regular connection through automatic reconnects.
Re:Anonabox Analysis
by yellowapple on Monday April 06, 2015 @06:14PM
(#9331003)
This is likely the reason why the Anonabox generates random SSIDs; it forces the user to expect to have to connect to a new network regularly, and additionally reduces the amount of time available for an attacker to attempt to create a duplicate AP.
Of course, even this tactic isn't foolproof, and it's made rather ineffective by Anonabox's rather glaring flaws, but I can understand the rationale.
That idea doesn't work, though. Most devices/OSes remember your last access point, and will, upon a Anonabox failure / deauth / whatever, happily reconnect to your regular (non-Tor!) WiFi AP. That instantly compromises you. Changing the Anonabox SSID doesn't change that.
I had a look at the Invizibox firmware and it is somewhat better than Anonabox. However, and this is important - they are not Open Source. They TOO are only patching a binary firmware delivered by the manufacturer of the router (Gainstrong).
While you can argue about the merits of a Tor-on-hardware solution they seem to have done a really good job of implementing things.
Their website: https://invizbox.io News they're planning to release a flashable firmware to plug the holes in Anonabox:https://twitter.com/invizbox/status/585116913321279488
[I've bought an invizbox but have no other affiliation]