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Re:The lack of HTTPS at Amazon: identifying items purchased ... by ivanr on Saturday April 04, 2015 @11:01AM (#9320997)
If Amazon has any secure cookies, they're not going to affect this particular attack. The traffic leg between the attacker and Amazon's servers can be encrypted, which means that she will receive the secure cookies. Because the leg between the victim and the attacker is not encrypted, the attacker simply rewrites the cookies to remove the "secure" flag. Thus, from the perspective of the victim the cookies are not secure.

To summarise, the attacker injects herself into the traffic stream, fully controlling the Amazon side of the communication, and forwards traffic to the victim rewriting as appropriate. The account compromise occurs when Amazon asks the victim for the password (as they do before each purchase) and the attacker captures the password (because it will have been sent to her, rather to Amazon).

Re:The lack of HTTPS at Amazon: identifying items purchased ... by steakejjs on Saturday April 04, 2015 @11:07AM (#9321010)
Sounds like we were always on the same page...

I never said an attacker can't do this. I'm saying an attacker can't do a s/https/http and have a user end up at an HTTP login page, where the attacker can sniff credentials.

Re:The lack of HTTPS at Amazon: identifying items purchased ... by nitrogen on Saturday April 04, 2015 @12:57PM (#9321346)
The attacker operates the http login page as a MITM. If they can mangle http traffic, they can run a full MITM.
Re:The lack of HTTPS at Amazon: identifying items purchased ... by coderzach on Saturday April 04, 2015 @04:16PM (#9322053)
yes they can. They make the secure login connection, and terminate it themselves, then route what they received along to the user with s/https/http.