China's Man-On-the-Side Attack on GitHub

Re:China's Man-On-the-Side Attack on GitHub by clippit on Monday March 30, 2015 @11:48PM (#9294254)

The injection has been stopped and Baidu's script checks if there exists a referer.

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Re:China's Man-On-the-Side Attack on GitHub by zaroth on Tuesday March 31, 2015 @02:15AM (#9294647)

What do you mean "has been" stopped? There's no definitively stopping this without HTTPS, which I'm pretty sure hasn't magically "happened" in China in the last couple days.

The GFW may have ceased its attack, but there's no check you can possibly add into an asset delivered over HTTP which can't be undone by the GFW.

As long as there's a script being delivered over HTTP, the GFW can intercept that script request and replace with a script of its own.

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Re:China's Man-On-the-Side Attack on GitHub by clippit on Tuesday March 31, 2015 @04:08AM (#9294921)

I mean the Javascript hijacking has been stopped. This DDoS mixes several ways and during the js hijacking period, GitHub returns `alert()` on specific url for blocking browsers sending ajax requests. For now, the infected urls are back to normal.

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Re:China's Man-On-the-Side Attack on GitHub by lgas on Tuesday March 31, 2015 @03:31AM (#9294829)

There don't even have to be scripts being served -- as long as HTML is being served over HTTP they can inject their own scripts.

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