Experience is information. It doesn't make sense to imagine a situation in which she has all the information about a thing, except experience. Either she has all of the information about it, or she doesn't.
Jackson's point here is specifically to show that there are at least two kinds of information: physical information, and information that is not physical. Bearing that in mind, what do you mean by: > "Either she has all of the information about it, or she doesn't."
I suppose that my objection falls under 4.2 in http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/, specifically, metaphysical physicalism: "there are no non-physical individuals, properties or relations and no non-physical facts".
What would be a good example of non-physical information?
Perhaps the point here is that "Mary gains new knowledge" is supposed to be so manifestly obvious that it doesn't need to be argued? If so, this seems far from obvious to me.
The point is that even IF you give Mary all that information, she's still missing some information. Then, that information must not be physical information. More to the point, there's a difference between the points you presented: In (A), you say Mary has all _physical_ knowledge (Jackson uses the word information, but the difference is unimportant). In (B), you note that she gets new _knowledge_. It follows that this knowledge must be non-physical, since we assumed that she had all physical knowledge, and yet, she didn't have this new knowledge.