The issue is still the same: if a system that doesn't perfectly share your goals is making decisions more effectively than you, it's cold comfort to tell yourself "this is just a control system, it's not really intelligent". As Gary Kasparov can confirm, a system with non-human reasoning patterns is still perfectly capable of beating you.
If we don't regard intelligence as something different from control, then I guess birds are the most intelligent because they can navigate complex air currents. Etc. That is a poor definition of intelligence, because its not helpful in distinguishing what we normally mean by 'smart' from mechanistic/logical systems.
And the discussion of rogue AIs is all about intelligence gone awry. Does anybody fear a control system that mis-estimates the corn crop? No, its about a malicious non-empathetic machine entity that coldly calculates how to defeat us. And that requires more that the current AI's are delivering.
To actually argue the point a little bit, the theory of expected-utility-maximizing agents is pretty much the framework in which all of mainstream AI research is situated. Yes, most current work is focused on tiny special cases, in limited domains, with a whole lot of tricks, hacks, and one-off implementations required to get decent results. You really do need a lot of specialized knowledge to be a successful researcher in deep learning, computer vision, probabilistic inference, robotics, etc. But almost all of that knowledge is ultimately in the service of trying to implement better and better approximations to optimal decision-theoretic agents. It's not an unreasonable question to ask, "what if this project succeeds?" (not at true optimality -- that's obviously excluded by computational hardness results -- but just at approximations that are as good or better than what the human brain does).
Do Nick Bostrom and Eliezer Yudkowsky understand when you would use a tanh vs rectified linear nonlinearity in a deep network? Do they know the relative merits of extended vs unscented Kalman filters, MCMC vs variational inference, gradient descent vs BFGS? I don't know, but I'd guess largely not. Is it relevant to their arguments? Not really. You can do a lot of interesting and clarifying reasoning about the behavior of agents at the decision-theoretic level of abstraction, without cluttering the argument with details of current techniques that may or may not be relevant to the limitations of whatever we eventually build.